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A MEETING OF THE MINDS IN ROME: ENDING 
THE CIRCULAR CONUNDRUM OF THE U.S.-ICC 
RELATIONSHIP 
CHRISTOPHER “KIP” HALE∗ 
MAANASA K. REDDY∗∗ 
“This is a great regret that we are not a signatory. I think we could 
have worked out some of the challenges that are raised concerning 
our membership. But that has not yet come to pass.”1 
—United States Secretary of State, Hillary R. Clinton 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During a blistering hot Roman summer in 1998, the world achieved 
something remarkable. With Grotian-like zeal, countries from every corner 
of the world agreed to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (“ICC”).2 In doing so, the international community took the first and 
most difficult step towards establishing a comprehensive international 
criminal justice system that could reach any individual in any land. The 
colossal nature of this international “legislative” moment cannot be 
understated.3 Permitting the investigation and prosecution of individuals 
within sovereign states by an international authority—no matter how 
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advised Judges at the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The 
Hague, The Netherlands. This article represents the views of the author and, except as specified 
otherwise, does not necessarily represent policy of the ABA or the ABA Center for Human Rights. 
 ∗∗ Maanasa Reddy is the Assistant Director of the Reproductive Rights Initiative at the Human 
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 1. Ewen MacAskill, Editorial, Clinton: It is a ‘great regret’ the U.S. is not in International 
Criminal Court, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 6, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/06/us-
international-criminal-court. 
 2. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3, available 
at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rome_Statute_120704-EN.pdf [hereinafter Rome 
Statute]. 
 3. LEILA NADYA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 11–14, 78–79, 108–09, 277 (2002). 
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jurisdictionally limited—is an immense divergence from the Westphalian 
concept of international law.4 
Yet, what was ‘remarkable’ about the events in Rome is truly in the eye 
of the beholder. To its supporters, the Rome Statute is a remarkable 
progression toward the institutionalization of the international rule of law, 
fair trial and due process rights, and the fight against impunity for mass 
atrocities.5 The moment of its passage was recounted in the following way: 
Extraordinary scenes of tension and jubilation followed. . . . As 
U.N. staff moved swiftly through the crowded aisle counting hand 
votes, tension mounted. . . . The defeat by enormous majorities of 
the amendments offered by India and by the U.S. insured the 
passage of the Statute and were greeted by uproarious celebrations.6 
To one of its key critics, the United States of America (“U.S.”), the Rome 
Statute was a remarkable departure from the previous international world 
order.7 The U.S. lead negotiator in Rome, then-U.S. Ambassador at large 
for War Crimes, David Scheffer, described the immediate aftermath of the 
Rome Statute’s passage:  
There was enormous applause and glee throughout the large room. 
Almost everyone stood and applauded and yelped, with civil society 
delegates in the room congratulating government delegates with the 
Italian delegation literally jumping up and down. They knew they 
 
 
 4. Id. at 8. 
For if many aspects of the Rome Treaty demonstrate the tenacity of traditional Westphalian 
notions of sovereignty, there are nonetheless elements of supranationalism and efficacy in the 
Statute that could prove extremely powerful. Not only does the Statute place State and non-
State actors side-by-side in the international arena, but the Court will put real people in real 
jails. Indeed, the establishment of the Court raises hopes that the lines between international 
law on the one hand, and world order on the other, are blurring, and that the normative 
structure being created by international law might one day influence or even restrain the 
Hobbesian order established by the politics of States. 
Id. 
 5. Sang-Hyun Song, The Role of the International Criminal Court in Ending Impunity and 
Establishing the Rule of Law, UN CHRONICLE (Sept. 24, 2012), http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/ 
chronicle/home/archive/issues2012/deliveringjustice/theroleoftheinternationalcriminalcourt. 
 6. John Washburn, The Negotiation of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court 
and International Lawmaking in the 21st Century, 11 PACE INT’L L. REV. 361, 372 (1999). 
 7. PATRICIA PINTO SOARES, THE ICC AT EIGHT: ASSESSING US POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW: RECIPROCAL INFLUENCES, CTR. FOR TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS, SAIS JOHN 
HOPKINS UNIV. 19–23 (2010) [hereinafter SAIS JOHN HOPKINS US-ICC REPORT], http://transatlantic 
.sais-jhu.edu/partnerships/Cornerstone%20Project/eu%20us%20cornerstone%20patricia%20pinto%20 
soares%20Final.pdf; William A. Schabas, United States’ Hostility to the International Criminal Court: 
It’s All About the Security Council, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 701, 713–14 (2004) (explaining that the true 
reason for U.S. objections to the ICC is that it takes power away from the UN Security Council to 
supervise or otherwise direct multilateral efforts on international peace and security).  
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had buried us, and they were ecstatic over achieving a treaty after so 
many years of tough negotiations. I remained seated, however, as I 
could hardly stand and applaud my own defeat on the vote.8 
Whether it was exuberance or dejection, all of the delegates in Rome, as 
well as government officials in capitals around the world, were reacting to 
more than just the passage of the Rome Statute. They were also observing 
a split between the U.S.—historically one of international justice’s most 
ardent supporters—and the future of the international criminal justice 
system.  
Since this momentous occasion, the U.S. has slowly but surely become 
an outsider in a field it was chiefly responsible for creating starting with its 
achievements at the Nuremberg trials.9 David Crane, an American, the 
first lead prosecutor at the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”) aptly 
compared this reclusive role to being outside in the cold, faced pressed up 
against the living room window, looking into a house that you helped 
build.10  
Certainly the U.S., or any State, does not have to ratify the Rome 
Statute in order to make a positive contribution to the field of international 
criminal justice. Yet, not being a formal member of the ICC is a far cry 
from the role the U.S. has historically occupied in similar situations. After 
all, the field of international law first gained momentum when the U.S. 
insisted, in a post World War II climate, upon trials for the defeated Nazis 
at a time when the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were calling for 
summary executions of their vanquished foes.11 Further, U.S. leadership 
was instrumental in the creation and successes of, most notably, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, SCSL, and Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia.12 Despite its historical prevalence in international 
 
 
 8. DAVID SCHEFFER, ALL THE MISSING SOULS: A PERSONAL HISTORY OF THE WAR CRIMES 
TRIBUNALS 223 (2012).  
 9. Jess Bravin, U.S. to Pull Out of World Court on War Crimes, WALL ST. J., May 6, 2002, at 
A4, available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/May6_2_02.pdf. 
 10. David Crane, Address at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting, at 148 (Aug. 3, 
2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/meetings_travel/2012_annual 
_final_program_book.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 11. Nuremberg Trial Fact Sheet, FACING HISTORY AND OURSELVES, http://tj.facinghistory.org/ 
reading/nuremberg-trials-fact-sheet (last visited Feb. 11, 2013). 
 12. Diane F. Orentlicher, Unilateral Multilarialism: United States Policy Towards the 
International Criminal Court, 36 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 415, 416, (2004); Justice Richard J. Goldstone, 
U.S. Withdrawal from ICC Undermines Decades of American Leadership in International Criminal 
Justice, INT’L CRIM. CT. MONITOR, June 2002, at 3, http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/International_ 
War_Crimes/USWithdrawal_ICC_Goldstone.html; Council on Foreign Relations, Speech by John 
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criminal justice, every time one of these United Nations (“UN”) ad hoc or 
hybrid internationalized tribunals closes, the U.S.’s role diminishes. 
This progression from leader to outsider is detrimental to the U.S. and 
arguably to the ICC as well. The ICC stands to benefit from greater U.S. 
engagement, particularly U.S. ratification or accession to the Rome 
Statute.13 To be clear, the 122 State Parties and counting to the Court14 
have achieved what was previously thought improbable, making the ICC a 
reputable court of law and respected international actor in ten short 
years.15 In doing so, these State Parties have shown that the U.S. is not 
absolutely necessary to establish and build an international criminal 
tribunal.  
Yet, a non-U.S. trajectory does not aid the process of fulfilling the 
ICC’s lofty mandate of ending impunity for mass atrocities; and, more 
acutely, it does not aid the ICC’s process of becoming the most effective, 
efficient, and influential international institution that it can and should 
be.16 The U.S. has exceptional capacity, knowledge, and experience in 
international criminal law and justice, and its government has a 
combination of economic, intelligence, logistical, and diplomatic 
resources shared by few, if any, other countries.17 This array of resources 
and capabilities can be pivotal in international criminal cases.18 If the ICC 
could put these resources to use consistently and robustly, it is not hard to 
imagine the immeasurable benefits. 
As it stands, the U.S. is self-ostracized from a field it once led; the ICC 
is making progress but certainly needs more support from States like the 
U.S. The solution seems simple enough: the U.S. and ICC together work 
 
 
Bellinger III, Legal Adviser to the U.S. Sec’y of State (Nov. 14, 2008), http://www.cfr.org/inter 
national-criminal-courts-and-tribunals/bellingers-speech-international-criminal-justice/p17777 (“[T]he 
United States’ strong and consistent support for international criminal justice—in the former 
Yugoslavia, in Rwanda, and in Sierra Leone, Cambodia, and Lebanon.”). 
 13. SAIS JOHN HOPKINS US-ICC REPORT, supra note 7, at 108–10, 115–16, 119 (concluding 
that the US is a “‘wish to have’ partner for the ICC.”); Giulio M. Gallarotti & Arik Y. Preis, Politics, 
International Justice, and the United States: Toward a Permanent International Criminal Court, 4 
UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1, 26 (1999) (“[h]aving the most powerful state in the world on 
board would position the Court to challenge the many hurdles of national sovereignty which will 
confront it.”) [hereinafter Gallarotti & Preis]. 
 14. INT’L CRIM. CT., THE STATE PARTIES TO THE ROME STATUTE, http://www2.icc-cpi.int/ 
Menus/ASP/states+parties (last visited Feb. 11, 2013). 
 15. Richard Dicker, The Court of Last Resort, FOREIGN POLICY (June 29, 2012), http://www. 
hrw.org/news/2012/06/29/icc-court-last-resort. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id.; SAIS JOHN HOPKINS US-ICC REPORT, supra note 7, at 105 (“[t]he political and 
economic power of the United States, allied to its intelligence expertise, makes it a major wish-to-have 
partner”).  
 18. Id.  
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diligently towards finding a way for the former to become a State Party. 
The U.S.-ICC relationship, however, is complicated by a difficult shared 
history, domestic and international politics, differences on law and 
procedure,19 and a lack of comprehensive interactions with one another.20 
The common response to the question of why the U.S. is not a State Party 
to the ICC is the perceived unacceptable level of exposure of U.S. citizens, 
namely military personnel, to ICC jurisdiction.21 This alleged culprit is, 
however, quite simply pretense. The likelihood of the ICC exerting 
jurisdiction over U.S. citizens is so small and easily managed that it is not 
a serious explanation of the U.S.-ICC divide.22 The divide is far more 
pragmatic. 
This Article’s explanation for what prevents a U.S.-ICC marriage, or at 
least more robust American governmental support of the ICC, is that the 
U.S. and ICC find themselves in a circular conundrum. The U.S. is 
hesitant to join the ICC or even provide robust and regular support to it—
as evidenced by its anti-ICC legislation—until the latter improves its 
functional ability to carry out all aspects of its mandate on its own and to 
do so consistently in a complicated geopolitical environment.23 However, 
the ICC, for its part, cannot overcome all the challenges it faces without 
more comprehensive and sustained support from powerful States, 
including the U.S.24 So, ICC improvement requires U.S. support, and U.S. 
 
 
 19. Scheffer, supra note 8, at 188, 231–32.  
 20. The first U.S. official interaction with the ICC was in 2009, seven years after it began 
operations. U.S. Stephen J. Rapp, Ambassador-at-large for War Crimes Issues, Dep’t of State, Address 
to Assembly of State Parties (Nov. 19, 2009), http://www.state.gov/j/gcj/us_releases/remarks/2009/ 
133316.htm. 
 21. ELLEN GRIGORIAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
TREATY: DESCRIPTION, POLICY ISSUES, AND CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS 9 (1999); Colonel Stuart W. 
Risch, Hostile Outsider or Influential Insider? The United States and the International Criminal 
Court, U.S. ARMY STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT, at 5–8 (2007), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTR 
Doc?AD=ADA471361. 
 22. See infra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 23. Vijay Padmanabhan, From Rome to Kampala: The U.S. Approach to the 2010 International 
Criminal Court Review Conference, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (2010), http://www.cfr.org/ 
international-criminal-courts-and-tribunals/rome-kampala/p21934 (“Moreover, the ICC has failed to 
accumulate a record of accomplishment to date that could be used to overcome political resistance.”).  
 24. Daniel Donovan, International Criminal Court: Successes and Failures of the Past and 
Goals for the Future, INT’L POLICY DIGEST (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org 
/2012/03/23/international-criminal-court-successes-and-failures-of-the-past-and-goals-for-the-future/; 
Eric Leonard, ICC Effectiveness Depends on Member State Cooperation, JURIST—HOTLINE (Jan. 3, 
2012), http://jurist.org/hotline/2012/01/eric-leonard-icc-effectiveness.php; see Moses Retselisitsoe 
Phooko, How Effective the International Criminal Court Has Been: Evaluating the Work and Progress 
of the International Criminal Court, 1 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L COMP. & HUMAN RIGHTS L. 182, 207–08 
(2011); Steven D. Roper & Lilian A. Barria, State Co-operation and International Criminal Court 
Bargaining Influence in the Arrest and the Surrender of Suspects, 21 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 457, 460–61 
(2008).  
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support requires ICC improvement; neither can happen without the other. 
As a result, it is clear that the biggest impediment to comprehensive 
progress in U.S.-ICC relations and possible U.S. ratification is not 
primarily a philosophical or political divide,25 but more a function of 
practical realities. Of course, the practical and political are intertwined. 
However, major progress in the practical is central to solving the political. 
This will require simultaneous progress towards one another by each 
party. 
The purpose of this Article is to help find a starting point to solve this 
problematic circle. The goal of improving the U.S.-ICC relationship 
should be desirable to both parties, as progress substantially benefits both, 
not to mention the cause of international criminal justice. This Article does 
not seek to judge either the U.S.’s or ICC’s role in their relationship, but 
rather to lay out the best ways to increase U.S. support of the ICC.  
Accordingly, the Article will set the stage in Section II by discussing a 
brief history of the U.S.-ICC relationship, with emphasis on major 
impediments in place on the U.S. side, namely American anti-ICC 
legislation. Section III will provide further context by looking at specific 
critiques and difficulties the ICC has faced. It is not the purpose of this 
Article to postulate on the validity of such critiques but address them as 
we find them. The nature of these challenges exhibits the ICC’s side of the 
conundrum.  
Next, in Section IV, this Article will examine precisely why the U.S.-
ICC circular conundrum should and must be resolved. It will address the 
specific benefits that each would gain from a closer partnership while also 
highlighting negative consequences that have resulted from their current 
arms-length relationship. Finally, this Article will outline 
recommendations on how this cycle can be broken. Like any problem of 
this character, the circle perpetuates itself unless it is interrupted. Yet, such 
interruptions or leaps of faith need not be radical. The U.S.-ICC 
relationship can reach a new, mutually beneficial height if both sides take 
incremental steps towards each other. Of course, it is more easily written 
 
 
 25. Plenty of scholars have argued that politics and philosophy are at the heart of the U.S. 
opposition to the ICC. See, e.g., William A. Schabas, United States Hostility to the International 
Criminal Court: It’s All About the Security Council, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 701 (2004), http://ejil.oxford 
journals.org/content/15/4/701.full.pdf. While certainly the U.S. saw and continues to see the ICC as 
undermining UN Security Council powers and other associated concerns, this and other political base 
analysis of U.S. opposition to the ICC still boils down to practical matters. The U.S. fears a court 
independent of UN Security Council oversight because it cannot predict or otherwise counterbalance 
how such a court would act in practice. If an independent ICC functions effectively and efficiently and 
does not act in an illegal or overtly political manner, than the U.S. or any State for that matter would 
not have any reason to be concerned. 
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than done. The suggestions put forth herein, however, are reasonable and 
attainable with concerted efforts from both sides. 
II. ANTI-ICC LEGISLATION IN THE U.S. 
At the closure of the five-week diplomatic conference the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court was adopted on July 17, 1998.26 The 
vote resulted in 120 in favor, 7 against, with 21 states abstaining.27 The 
U.S. was one of the seven countries that voted against the treaty along 
with Iraq, Israel, Libya, The People’s Republic of China, Qatar, and 
Yemen.28 The U.S. vote against the Rome Statute came against a backdrop 
where the U.S. Senate voted in support of the concept of a permanent 
international criminal court,29 and President Clinton encouraged the 
establishment of such a court only a year earlier.30 On the very last day 
that it was open for signature, however, Ambassador Scheffer took a last-
minute train from Washington, D.C. to New York City and trudged 
through the snow to sign the Rome Statute at the United Nations on 
December 30, 2000, with President Clinton’s authorization.31 
The complicated relationship between the U.S. and ICC began years 
prior to the finalization of the Rome Statute at the Preparatory 
Commission (“PrepCom”). The PrepCom was established in Resolution F 
of the Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 
when it became clear that additional documents would be necessary in 
order to create a fully functioning ICC.32 At the time, eight such 
documents were identified and included in Resolution F of the Final Act 
of the Rome Diplomatic conference.33 The U.S. played an active role in 
 
 
 26. Rome Statute, supra note 2. 
 27. U.S. at Odds with Global Criminal Court, DESERET NEWS, June 12, 2000, at A02 
[hereinafter U.S. at Odds], available at http://www.deseretnews.com/article/799651/US-at-odds-with-
global-criminal-court.html?pg=all. 
 28. Michael P. Scharf, Results of the Rome Conference for an International Criminal Court, 
ASIL INSIGHTS (1998), http://www.asil.org/insigh23.cfm. 
 29. Jim Anderson, U.S. Shies Away From International Criminal Court, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-
AGENTUR (July 18, 1999). 
 30. See Benjamin Ferencz, A Prosecutor’s Personal Account: From Nuremberg to Rome, 52 J. 
INT’L AFF. 455, 462 (1999), available at http://www.benferencz.org/index.php?id=4&article=82. 
 31. DAVID SCHEFFER, ALL THE MISSING SOULS: A PERSONAL HISTORY OF THE WAR CRIMES 
TRIBUNALS 240–43 (2012). 
 32. G.A. Res. 53/105, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/105 (Jan. 26, 1999); see also U.N. Preparatory 
Commission for International Criminal Court Begins First Session, M2 PRESSWIRE (Feb. 17, 1999) 
[hereinafter First Session]. 
 33. G.A. Res. 51/207, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/10 (July 17, 1998). 
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many of the PrepCom meetings.34 In fact, compromises were made during 
the meetings in order to retain U.S. involvement and allay its fears of 
unrestricted prosecution of American nationals.35 For example, the ICC 
had automatic jurisdiction over genocide and crimes against humanity, but 
not over war crimes—those most likely to be charged against U.S. 
nationals.36 The provision would also allow the U.S. to prosecute its own 
citizens prior to the ICC’s involvement.37 This trend of U.S. attempts to 
gain unique coverage continued even after the Rome Statute’s passage. 
During the last meeting in which non-State Parties were able to participate 
on November 27, 2000,38 the U.S. attempted to exempt its citizens through 
unspecified international agreements.39 
After President Clinton’s departure from the White House, the U.S. 
relationship with the ICC took on a considerably harsher tone under 
President Bush, in large part due to his administration’s post-9/11 hard 
power strategy.40 In addition to anti-ICC legislation, the Bush 
administration “unsigned” the Rome Statute with the filing of the 
controversial Bolton letter at the United Nations.41 Further, the U.S. 
stopped sending observer delegations to the ICC’s annual Assembly of 
States Parties (“ASP”).42 In the latter years of the Bush administration, the 
relationship began to thaw with U.S. acquiescence to the UN Security 
Council referral of the Sudan to the ICC.43 The onset of President 
 
 
 34. Elizabeth Neuffer, War Crimes Tribunal Adopted as U.S. Votes ‘No,’ BOS. GLOBE, July 18, 
1998, at A1. 
 35. Elizabeth Neuffer, War Crimes Tribunal Adopted as U.S. Votes ‘No,’ BOS. GLOBE, July 18, 
1998, at A1; Jeremy Rabkin, This Court Would be Criminal; Congressional Republicans’ Just War on 
the International Criminal Court, WKLY. STANDARD, June 26, 2000, at 19. 
 36. See supra note 35. 
 37. Q & A International Criminal Court, BBC (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ 
world-11809908. 
 38. U.S. Wants Deal Exempting Americans From U.N. Court by Dec. 31, DOW JONES INT’L 
NEWS (Oct. 18, 2000) [hereinafter DOW JONES INT’L NEWS]. 
 39. See Jim Wurst, Politics: Disagreement Over Meaning of Criminal Court Compromise, INTER 
PRESS SERV. (July 2, 2000), http://www.ipsnews.net/2000/07/politics-disagreement-over-the-meaning-
of-criminal-court-compromise/. 
 40. From the perspective of President Bush’s administration, the ICC represents the 
“international system” and an unwarranted check on U.S. hard power. STEVEN E. SCHIER, PANORAMA 
OF A PRESIDENCY: HOW GEORGE W. BUSH ACQUIRED AND SPENT HIS POLITICAL CAPITAL 128 
(2009). 
 41. DOW JONES INT’L NEWS, supra note 38. 
 42. See ABA Sec. of Int’l Law, Sec. of Crim. Justice Res. 108A (2008), available at 
http://www.amicc.org/docs/ABAresolution108Areport.pdf. 
 43. S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1593 (2005), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonly 
res/85FEBD1A-29F8-4EC4-9566-48EDF55CC587/283244/N0529273.pdf; see also Press Release, 
Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, 
U.N. Press Release SC/8351 (Mar. 31, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/ 
sc8351.doc.htm. 
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Obama’s tenure saw further positive developments in the U.S.-ICC 
relationship including: the U.S. returning observer delegations to the 
ASP;44 the start of constructive support of the ICC on a case-by-case 
basis;45 and the U.S. vote in favor at the UN Security Council referral of 
the Libya situation to the ICC.46  
As is evident from this brief synopsis, the U.S.-ICC relationship is 
fraught with history and complications. This point is no better captured 
than in the aforementioned U.S.’s anti-ICC legislation. These pieces of 
legislation distance the U.S. from the ICC and undermine the Court. Such 
legislation either restricts U.S. cooperation with, or funding to, the ICC. 
Other laws punished foreign countries for not taking an equally hostile 
approach to the Court.47 Some of these anti-ICC laws have been repealed 
or diminished over the past few years.48 Despite these steps towards a less 
antagonistic relationship, the remaining U.S. laws still in place greatly 
impede upon closer relations between the two. 
One such notable law, Public Law No. 106-113, §§ 705–706, also 
known as the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act49 (“FSA”), prohibits U.S. funds from being 
used to support the ICC.50 It further prohibits extradition of U.S. citizens 
to foreign countries obligated to cooperate with the ICC unless the foreign 
country delivers a guarantee that the U.S. citizen will not be sent to the 
 
 
 44. International Criminal Court, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE (Dec. 15, 2012), http://www.state.gov/j/ 
gcj/icc/index.htm.  
 45. Press Release, Remarks by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the 
U.N., at a UN Security Council Debate on Peace & Justice, with a Special Focus on the Role of the 
International Criminal Court (Oct. 17, 2012), http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2012/ 
10/20121017137632.html?CP.rss=true#axzz2FSocn1Or. 
 46. S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011), available at http://www.unhcr.org/ref 
world/docid/4d6ce9742.html; see also Kevin Jon Heller, Security Council Refers the Situation in Libya 
to ICC, OPINIO JURIS (Feb. 27, 2011), http://opiniojuris.org/2011/02/27/security-council-refers-the-
situation-in-libya-to-the-icc/. 
 47. American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-206 (2002) (as amended 
Oct. 17, 2006 and Jan. 28, 2008) (The original version of the law prohibited US military assistance to 
certain ICC States Parties unless they “entered into an agreement with the United States pursuant to 
Article 98 of the Rome Statute preventing the International Criminal court from proceeding against 
United States personnel present in such country.”). 
 48. “Nethercutt Amendment” to the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related 
Programs Appropriations Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447 (2004); see also Lucia DiCicco, The Non-
Renewal of the “Nethercutt Amendment” and its Impact on the Bilateral Immunity Agreement (BIA) 
Campaign, AM. NON-GOV. ORGS. COAL. FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT. (Apr. 30, 2009), http://www.amicc 
.org/docs/Nethercutt2009.pdf. 
 49. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, §§ 705–706, 113 Stat. 1501 
(1999), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-106publ113/pdf/PLAW-106publ113.pdf. 
 50. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, §§ 705–706 (1999). 
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ICC.51 These provisions remain law and have been broadly construed to 
prevent any financial support of the ICC, no matter how nominal.52 
Further, this blanket prohibition on U.S. financial assistance to the ICC 
has no waivers.53 As a result, this prohibition limits the U.S. to giving only 
“in-kind” contributions to the ICC.54 Together with other anti-ICC 
legislation, the end result of FSA is that the U.S. cannot supply the ICC 
with comprehensive, institution building finances and support, a form of 
assistance that would be best for the Court at this still-early stage of its 
development.55  
Another obstructionist piece of U.S. legislation is the American 
Service-Members Protection Act of 2002 (“ASPA”), or Public Law 
107-206.56 Sometimes referred to as the “Hague Invasion Act,” ASPA was 
adopted originally in August 2002, shortly after the administration 
“unsigned” the Rome Statute.57 ASPA effectively prevents any American 
citizen or ‘allied person’ from being prosecuted by the ICC; if such a 
person is detained by the ICC, the U.S. President is able to use “all means 
necessary and appropriate” to ensure their release.58 It also prohibits 
military aid to State Parties to the ICC with a few exceptions, namely 
when “important to the national interest of the United States.”59 Moreover, 
its provisions essentially made U.S. support of peacekeeping missions 
contingent on ICC immunity for U.S. personnel.60 
In close conjunction with ASPA, the U.S. negotiated Bilateral 
Immunity Agreements (“BIAs”) with some 102 other states,61 whereby 
 
 
 51. Id. § 706. 
 52. See generally AM. NON-GOV. ORGS. COAL. FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT., Anti-ICC Legislation, 
http://www.amicc.org/usicc/legislation (last visited Mar. 5, 2013).  
 53. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, §§ 705–706 (1999). 
 54. Harold Hongju Koh & Stephen J. Rapp, Special Briefing, U.S. Engagement With the ICC and 
the Outcome of the Recently Concluded Review Conference (June 15, 2010), http://www.state.gov/j/ 
gcj/us_releases/remarks/2010/143178.htm. 
 55. Kip Hale, The Price We Must Pay for International Criminal Justice, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Nov. 19 2012), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kip-hale/international-criminal-court-
funding_b_2149834.html. 
 56. American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-206, § 2002 (as 
amended October 17, 2006 and January 28, 2008) [hereinafter ASPA]. 
 57. Letter from John R. Bolton, then Under Sec’y of State for Arms Control and Int’l Sec., to 
The Honorable Kofi Annan, Sec’y Gen. of the U.N. (May 6, 2002) [hereinafter Bolton Letter], 
available at http://amicc.org/docs/bolton.pdf. 
 58. ASPA, supra note 56, § 2002. 
 59. Id. § 2007(b). 
 60. See H.R. 1646, 107th Cong. § 635(a) (2002), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ 
BILLS-107hr1646eh/pdf/BILLS-107hr1646eh.pdf. 
 61. AM. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGS. COAL. FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT., Countries Concluding 
Bilateral Immunity Agreements (2013), http://amicc.org/usicc/bialist (listing the 102 nations who 
signed BIA agreements with the U.S.). 
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States agreed to ensure that the ICC would not gain jurisdiction over 
American citizens on their territory.62 The original version of the ASPA 
prohibited U.S. military assistance to certain ICC State Parties unless they 
entered into a BIA.63  
It did not take long for the U.S. government, however, to realize the ills 
of its anti-ICC effort. Specifically, the U.S. Department of Defense 
strongly criticized the effects of ASPA and the BIAs campaign.64 Many 
complained about the restriction of International Military Education and 
Training (“IMET”) and Foreign Military Funds (“FMF”) in countries 
where BIAs were not signed.65 Senior Pentagon officials stated that such 
constraints undermined U.S. national security interests.66 
Consequently, ASPA has been twice amended since its initial 
introduction. The first amendment occurred on October 17, 2006, when it 
was amended to remove IMET restrictions for all countries.67 This move 
came after President Bush had issued presidential waivers of IMET 
prohibitions to many States due to pressure from the Department of 
Defense.68 Similarly, in January 2008, Congress again amended APSA to 
eliminate FMF restrictions on all States.69 During this same time, other 
anti-ICC laws were allowed to expire, all of which were impediments to a 
mutually beneficial U.S.-ICC relationship.70 
 
 
 62. ASPA, supra note 56, § 2004. 
 63. Id. §§ 2005(c)(2)–(c)(3). 
 64. Fiscal Year 2006 Defense Budget: Hearing on Request for U.S. European Command, U.S. 
Pacific Command, and U.S. Southern Command Before the H. Armed Servs. Comm., 105th Cong. 
(2005) (Testimony of Bantz J. Craddock) [hereinafter Craddock Hearing], available at 
http://www.amicc.org/docs/Craddock%20Statements%203-05.pdf; see U.S. Congressional Hearing, 
Senate Armed Services Committee, Testimony of Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby, http://www.amicc.org/ 
docs/Jacoby%20Statements%203-05.pdf; Rick Maze, New Rules May Hinder U.S. Training for 
Foreign Troops, DEFENSE NEWS, May 9, 2005, at 14, available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/Defense 
%20News%205-9-05.pdf. 
 65. Fiscal Year 2006 National Defense Authorization Budget Request: Hearing before the H. 
Armed Servs. Comm., 109th Cong. (2005) (Statement by General B. J. Craddock, U.S. Army 
Commander, United States Southern Command). 
 66. Craddock Hearing, supra note 64. 
 67. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, 
§ 1222, 120 Stat. 2423 (2006). 
 68. Memorandum of President George Bush on Waiving Prohibition on United States Military 
Assistance With Respect to Various Parties to the Rome Statute Establishing the International 
Criminal Court (Oct. 2, 2006), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2006-10-09/pdf/ 
WCPD-2006-10-09-Pg1708-2.pdf. 
 69. Press Release, The White House, President Bush Signs H.R. 4986, the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 into Law (Jan. 28, 2008), available at http://www.amicc.org/ 
docs/White%20House%20Statement%2028%20January%202008.pdf. 
 70. Anti-ICC Legislation, AMICC, http://www.amicc.org/usicc/legislation (last visited Aug. 19, 
2013) (listing anti-ICC legislation that is no longer in effect). 
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Despite this pullback, the remaining provisions of ASPA prohibit the 
U.S. government from cooperating with or assisting the ICC on a wide 
range of matters.71 Considering that the ICC depends almost exclusively 
on State cooperation and assistance for much of its enforcement and 
related functioning, this type of legislation is particularly harmful. 
However, ASPA includes presidential waivers that allow for such 
cooperation and assistance to occur.72 These waivers, in conjunction with 
the Dodd Amendment in ASPA, are precisely the means with which 
President Obama currently authorizes U.S. support to the ICC on a case-
by-case basis.73 Nevertheless, a future administration could just as easily 
refrain from using these waivers and/or utilizing the Dodd Amendment, 
which would again reinstate an almost complete blackout on U.S.-ICC 
relations. 
III. CHALLENGES AT THE ICC 
In its first ten years,74 the ICC has faced a number of significant 
challenges, a fact that is not unexpected for a court in its infancy and with 
an unprecedented mandate.75 These include, inter alia, issues pertaining to 
the expediency of proceedings, prosecutorial decisions, and investigative 
tactics.76 These institutional growing pains are surmountable if sustained 
efforts to improve the long-term functionality of the ICC are undertaken—
 
 
 71. See, e.g., ASPA, supra note 56, § 2004 (prohibition on general requests for cooperation, 
interrogatory letters, extradition inquiries, use of appropriated funds, mutual legal assistance, and 
investigative activities); § 2005 (prohibition on participation in relevant peacekeeping operations), 
§ 2006 (prohibition on direct or indirect transfer of national security and law enforcement 
information). 
 72. ASPA, supra note 56 (Amendment No. 3787 to Amendment No. 3597 Senator Dodd’s 
second-degree amendment to ASPA 2002).  
 73. Id. “Nothing in this title shall prohibit the United States from rendering assistance to 
international efforts to bring to justice Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic, Osama bin Laden, other 
members of Al Quaeda, leaders of Islamic Jihad, and other foreign nationals accused of genocide, war 
crimes or crimes against humanity.” Id.  See, e.g., Elise Keppler, The ICC Ten Years On: Challenges 
and Opportunities for Africa, THINK AFRICA PRESS (Aug. 16, 2012), http://thinkafricapress.com/legal 
/icc-completes-decade-challenges-and-opportunities-africa; Tenth Anniversary of the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, THE COMMONWEALTH (July 1, 2012), http://www.thecommon 
wealth.org/news/ 248257/020712romestatute.htm; Ian Paisley, Op-ed, Peace Must Not be the Victim of 
International Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/17/opinion/ 
peace-must-not-be-the-victim-of-international-justice.html?_r=0.  
 74. The Court became operational on July 1, 2002 with the 60th ratification of the Rome Statute. 
About the Court, Int’l Crim. Ct., http://www.10a.icc-cpi.info/index.php/en/about (last visited Feb. 11, 
2013). 
 75. See, e.g., Elise Keppler, supra note 73; TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ROME STATUTE, supra 
note 73; Ian Paisley, supra note 73. 
 76. Rene Blattmann & Kirsten Bowman, Achievements and Problems of the International 
Criminal Court: A View from Within, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 711, 712 (2008). 
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a critically important fact at the heart of current U.S. resistance and of 
changing that position.77 Yet, as will be discussed, the current predicament 
is getting countries, both State and non-State Parties, to provide the 
appropriate levels of support needed to achieve such improvements to the 
Court. 
In order to understand the relevant issues facing the Court fully, it is 
vital to keep in mind that, akin to any international organization like the 
ICC, state cooperation is a crucial factor in the ability of the institution to 
perform its core functions.78 In all stages of its activities, the ICC relies on 
the cooperation of states and international organizations to carry out its 
key responsibilities.79 The ICC requires support and cooperation, inter 
alia, with respect to the arrest and surrender of suspects,80 protection and 
relocation of witnesses,81 and enforcement of sentences,82 just to name a 
few.83 Hence, the more State Parties to the Rome Statute and the more 
invested States are in the ICC process, the better able the Court is to carry 
out its duties.84 
Turning now to challenges, the decisions made by the ICC’s Office of 
the Prosecutor (“OTP”) over the past ten years have come under scrutiny 
from commentators and States alike.85 One specific critique was that the 
investigative strategy used by the OTP relied heavily on intermediaries to 
complete investigations.86 Due to the nature of its work, the Court is active 
in situations of ongoing conflict, which gives rise to security challenges 
when trying to gather evidence on the ground.87 The task of many field 
 
 
 77. Mahmood Mamdani, The New Humanitarian Order, THE NATION (Sept. 10, 2008), available 
at http://www.thenation.com/article/new-humanitarian-order. 
 78. Antonio Cassese, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary 
Reflections, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 144, 164–67 (1999).  
 79. Rene Blattmann & Kirsten Bowman, Achievements and Problems of the International 
Criminal Court, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 722, 723 (2008). 
 80. Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 89–92. 
 81. Id. arts. 87, 93. 
 82. Id. arts. 103–06. 
 83. The ICC is dependent on countries to execute its arrest warrants because it does not have a 
police force. This causes delays and obstacles in getting custody of suspects. Thus, President Bashir 
and two other ICC suspects, Sudanese government officials, remain free as Khartoum unleashes a new 
round of atrocities in southern Sudan. Edith M. Lederer, ICC Asks UN to Help Arrest Sudan’s 
President, THE GUARDIAN (June 5, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/10274746. 
 84. Bruce Knotts, Letter to the Editor, WALL ST. J., June 19, 2012, at A12. 
 85. Julie Flint & Alex de Waal, Case Closed: A Prosecutor Without Borders, WORLD AFFAIRS 
(Spring 2009), http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/case-closed-prosecutor-without-borders. 
 86. OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, REPORT, INTERMEDIARIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: A ROLE FOR THE ASSEMBLY OF STATES PARTIES (Dec. 2011), http://www.open 
societyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/intermediaries-20111212.pdf.  
 87. Alex Whiting, Lead Evidence and Discovery Before the International Criminal Court: The 
Lubanga Case, 14 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 207, 210 (2009). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
594 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 12:581 
 
 
 
 
offices, such as those in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, 
Chad, and Central African Republic is, inter alia, to conduct investigations 
on behalf of the OTP.88 Often due to cited security reasons for staff and 
victims, the field presence has been lessened, postponed, or cancelled, thus 
necessitating the use of evidence accumulated by others.89  
Other investigative problems, such as internal decision-making and 
institutional limitations, and many other additional explanations are behind 
this use of secondary evidence.90 Nevertheless, if greater emphasis inside 
and outside of the ICC was placed on the importance of capable 
investigative staff being on the ground, and if this investigative staff were 
equipped with appropriate intelligence and security support, this would 
increase the likelihood of collecting more probative and reliable 
evidence.91 
The way that the OTP has handled sexual and gender-based violent 
crimes has also been unsatisfactory to some.92 The Rome Statute 
established jurisdiction to try various situations of sexual violence, 
including rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution or sterilization, and 
forced pregnancy.93 Despite the legal jurisdiction to pursue various forms 
of sexual violence cases and clear indications of such criminal behavior in 
its cases,94 the ICC has not upheld charges of sexual violence to date.95 
Furthermore, it has been pointed out that sexual violence was charged in 
only eight of the fifteen ICC cases, despite evidence to support such
 
 
 88. Katy Glassborow, ICC Investigative Strategy Under Fire, INST. FOR WAR & PEACE 
REPORTING (Oct. 17, 2008), http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/164/28571.html. 
 89. Andrew Cayley, Witness Proofing—The Experience of a Prosecutor, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 
780 (2008) (One of the OTP’s original senior trial attorney for Darfur, Andrew Cayley, described the 
difference between the ICTY’s approach to investigating and the ICC’s approach to investigating 
colorfully: “Cassese went personally to Kober prison and interviewed very sensitive witnesses. He 
demanded access with nothing more than a Security Council resolution. The OTP got no further than 
the Hilton Hotel.”).  
 90. See Julie Flint & Alex de Waal, Case Closed: A Prosecutor Without Borders, WORLD 
AFFAIRS (Spring 2009), http://www.amicc.org/docs/WorldAffairsJournalSpring2009.pdf. 
 91. AM. UNIV. WASH. COLLEGE OF LAW, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT LEGAL ANALYSIS 
AND EDUCATION PROJECT, INVESTIGATIVE MANAGEMENT, STRATEGIES, AND TECHNIQUES OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’S OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR 1–14 (Oct. 2012), available at 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/warcrimes/icc/documents/ICCReport16.pdf. 
 92. Laurie Green, First-Class Crimes, Second-Class Justice: Cumulative Charges for Gender-
Based Crimes at the International Criminal Court, 11 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 529, 529–30 (2011).  
 93. Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 7(1)(g), 8(2)(b)(xxii), 8(2)(e)(vi). 
 94. David Smith, ICC Acquits Congolese Militia Leader over Atrocities, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 
18, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/dec/18/icc-acquits-congolese-militia-leader-atrocities. 
 95. Id. 
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charges.96 In over half of those eight cases, the charges were struck down 
at the confirmation of charges stage.97  
Brigid Inder, who was recently appointed as OTP special gender 
advisor to address these concerns, attributed these poor numbers to three 
factors: insufficient amounts of evidence being put forward, lack of quality 
evidence, and inadequate framing of the charges.98 Again, it is the lack of 
emphasis on obtaining proper access to evidence in combination with 
internal decision-making that are at the core of this challenge facing the 
ICC.  
Another critique that the ICC faces is the lack of speed at which cases 
are completed. To date, eighteen cases in eight situations have been 
brought before the ICC.99 In the past ten years, however, the ICC has 
completed two trials, the Thomas Lubanga100 and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui 
cases.101 The Lubanga case took six years total to prosecute at the pretrial 
and trial stages.102 The case ended in a conviction on March 14, 2012.103 
The OTP and the Congolese militia leader filed notices of appeal, 
however, so the case will be further litigated.104 These statistics raise 
questions about the right of the accused to be tried without undue delay,105 
not to mention case and trial management practices and the use of Court 
resources. 
This often cited complaint, the speed-of-trail criticism, of the 
international criminal tribunals overlooks important considerations. The 
 
 
 96. Brigid Inder, Address at University of New South Wales “Justice for All?” Conference (Feb. 
18, 2012), available at http://www.intlawgrrls.com/2012/02/icc-and-gender-justice.html.  
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Situations and Cases, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20 
and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx (last visited Mar. 5, 2013).  
 100. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04–01/06, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 
of the Statute (Mar 14. 2012).  
 101. Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04–01/07, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of 
the Statute (Dec 18, 2012). 
 102. Stephanie Kammer, Deconstructing Lubanga, The ICC’s First Case: The Trial and 
Conviction of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, AM. NON-GOV. ORGS. COAL. FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT. & 
COLUMBIA UNIV. INST. FOR THE STUDY OF HUMAN RIGHTS, at 4 (2012), http://www.amicc.org/docs/ 
Deconstructing_Lubanga.pdf. 
 103. Eric Posner, The Absurd International Criminal Court, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2012, at A13. 
 104. Wairagala Wakabi, Congo-Kinshasa: Lubanga to Appeal ICC Conviction but Prosecutor 
Wants Him to Get Longer Jail Term, ALLAFRICA (Oct. 4, 2012), http://allafrica.com/stories/2012 
10050491.html. 
 105. Ralph Zacklin, The Failings of Ad Hoc Tribunals, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 541, 543–44 (2004) 
(“The delays in bringing detainees to trial—and the trials themselves—have generally been so lengthy 
that questions have been raised as to the violation by the tribunals of the basic human rights guarantees 
set out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCRP) [sic]. Justice delayed is 
justice denied, which also raises the question of whether justice has been done to the victims.”). 
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international criminal cases, by their nature, have built-in characteristics 
that slow them down no matter how efficient the process, such as number 
of witnesses and massive oral and documentary translation needs.106 
Moreover, it is sometimes preferable for cases to progress slowly due to 
the complicated, constantly unfolding nature of the situations under 
investigation and prosecution.107 Also, a new court like the ICC is 
navigating its rules and procedures for the first time and litigating a 
plethora of unprecedented issues. This process takes time and careful 
consideration, particularly considering the novel nature of the ICC’s 
victim participation and reparations scheme.108 Despite all of these often 
overlooked factors, the ICC inefficiencies are still apparent and in need of 
timely resolution.109 It is very likely that the cases and situations will only 
get increasingly complex.  
These delays in process as well as the other issues raised in this section 
could have been avoided or better prepared for110 with more robust 
capacity support from States, particularly from countries with a multitude 
of resources, diplomatic and political power, and unique know-how in 
international criminal justice like the U.S.111 The ICC can do much to 
 
 
 106. Int’l Crim. Ct., Office of the Prosecutor, Measures Available to the International Criminal 
Court to reduce the Length of Proceedings: Informal Expert Paper, at 3 (2003), available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/20BB4494-70F9-4698-8E30-907F631453ED/281982/length_of_ 
proceedings.pdf (“Due to the fact that international crimes typically involve atrocities committed on a 
massive scale, international criminal justice has to cope with cases which are more extensive and 
complex than most national cases. In particular, hundreds of witnesses will have to be interpreted and 
heard and volumes of documentary evidence will have to be translated and evaluated. The complexity 
will be multiplied whenever more than one conflict fall to be addressed concurrently.”). 
 107. See generally Alex Whiting, In International Criminal Prosecutions, Justice Delayed can be 
Justice Delivered, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 323 (2009), available at http://www.harvardilj.org/site/wp-
content/uploads/2010/07/HILJ_50-2_Whiting.pdf. 
 108. Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 68, 75. The Rules of Procedure and Evidence include 
gender specific provisions, which are applicable to the Victims and Witnesses Unit, to ensure that 
survivors of sexual violence are not discriminated against or further traumatized in court. Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence of the Int’l Crim. Ct., Rules 16–18, 112 (v), ICCASP/1/3 (2002). The Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence include gender specific provisions, which are applicable to the Victims and 
Witnesses Unit, to ensure that survivors of sexual violence are not discriminated against or further 
traumatized in court. For example, Rule 112(iv) allows the recording of questioning by the Prosecutor 
if this “could assist in reducing any subsequent traumatization of a victim of sexual or gender violence, 
a child or a person with disabilities in providing their evidence.” Additionally, the judiciary and staff 
of the ICC must be composed of both men and women, and during gender sensitive trails there must be 
an expert on dealing with crimes of sexual violence. These rules are mandatory and must be followed. 
The Court also provides protection, support, and reparations for victims and witnesses to help victims 
rebuild their lives. 
 109. Daniel Donovan, International Criminal Court: Successes and Failures of the Past and 
Goals for the Future, INT’L POLICY DIGEST (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/ 
2012/03/23/international-criminal-court-successes-and-failures-of-the-past-and-goals-for-the-future/. 
 110. See Erik Mose, Main Achievements of the ICTR, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 920, 929–32 (2005).  
 111. Gallarotti & Preis, supra note 13, at 26 (“Having the most powerful state in the world on 
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address these concerns, and is undertaking “lessons learned” exercises and 
other initiatives to accomplish an upgrade in its functional performance.112 
Yet, to achieve critical improvements, such as arresting fugitive and 
putting forth better evidence in more efficient trials, the States hold the 
key.113 The ICC, by its nature as an international institution, is limited in 
what it can accomplish.114 
IV. REASONS TO BREAK FREE 
We now see the practicalities at play in the US-ICC relationship. The 
U.S. has placed legislative impediments to better relations with the ICC 
and ratification of the Rome Statute, while the ICC has a number of 
institutional challenges partly caused by State cooperation and assistance 
issues. Simply put, the U.S. is more likely to move increasingly closer to 
the ICC as it has in the past few years only if the ICC overcomes some 
capacity driven and performance issues.115 The situation at the ICC, 
however, will likely remain substantially the same without the support of 
States like the U.S. that have unique ability and resources to help.116 
Describing the U.S.-ICC relationship, although helpful, only explains the 
circumstances at play. Reasons must be put forth as to why these practical 
hurdles should be overcome. To foster change, we need comprehensive 
and persuasive answers to relevant, critical policy questions. These 
questions, simple as they may be, are at the core of this dilemma. First, 
why should the U.S. be interested in improving relations with, or 
becoming a member of, the ICC? And second, why should the ICC itself 
focus its limited time and resources on the tall feat of garnering greater 
engagement from the U.S.?   
 
 
board would position the Court to challenge the many hurdles of national sovereignty which will 
confront it.”). 
 112. Judge Sang-Hyum Song, President of the Int’l Crim. Ct., Remarks to the 11th Session of the 
Assembly of States Parties, The Hague (Nov. 14, 2012), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/ 
rdonlyres/0EEEED0E-5BA8-4894-8AB5-3C2C90CD301B/0/ASP11OpeningPICCSongENG.pdf. 
 113. Roper & Barria, supra note 24, at 457. 
 114. Id. at 458. 
 115. U.S. Policy Toward the International Criminal Court: Furthering Positive Engagement, 
Report of the Independent Task Force, AM. SOC. OF INT’L LAW, at 17 (Mar. 2009) [hereinafter ASIL 
US-ICC Task Force], http://www.asil.org/files/asil-08-discpaper2.pdf. 
 116. SAIS JOHN HOPKINS US-ICC REPORT, supra note 7, at 119; Moses Retselisitsoe Phooko, 
supra note 24, at 207–08; Roper & Barria, supra note 24, at 460–61; Leonard, supra note 24. 
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A. Reasons for the U.S. to Improve Relations with, and Ultimately Join, 
the ICC 
1. The ICC is not a Threat 
There are a bevy of compelling and interrelated benefits for the U.S. to 
push for concrete advancements in the U.S.-ICC relationship. Before 
discussing these benefits, however, it is important to address the most 
persistent misapprehension within the U.S. about the ICC, which is that 
the ICC is a threat to the U.S. sovereignty in the form of unjust 
prosecution of American citizens, among other related problems.117 Since 
the Rome Statute’s inception, and through the first ten years of the ICC’s 
existence, many have argued meticulously and cogently that ICC 
jurisdiction over Americans is unlikely for many reasons.118 There is no 
need to redo those impressive efforts here. Yet, it is worth stating that no 
matter how one analyzes this jurisdictional issue, it is no longer a credible 
argument that ICC jurisdiction over U.S. officials or citizens is a 
legitimate concern.119  
The Rome Statute and the other ICC core documents clearly make the 
ICC a court of last resort. ICC jurisdiction over the citizens of any 
developed and engaged domestic jurisdictions is almost impossible, 
provided domestic investigations and prosecutions do in fact occur and are 
done in good faith and not as a ploy to shield perpetrators from due 
 
 
 117. SAIS JOHN HOPKINS US-ICC REPORT, supra note 7, at 12–26; Gallarotti & Preis, supra note 
13, at 26–33. 
 118. David Scheffer & Ashley Cox, The Constitutionality of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 983, 997–1004, 1065–68 (2008), http://www.law 
.northwestern.edu/jclc/backissues/v98/n3/9803_983.Scheffer_Cox.pdf.Scheffer_Cox.pdf (explaining, 
inter alia, that the ICC and the principle of complementarity would be highly deferential to US courts 
asserting jurisdiction over Americans, that compliance with the ICC would not offend American 
extradition jurisprudence and law, the Rome Statute does not offend Article III and other relevant 
provisions of the US Constitution and that the due process protections in the Rome Statute would 
survive judicial scrutiny by an American court); ABA, Sec. of Int’l Law and Prac., Sec. of Crim. 
Justice, Sec. of Individual Rights and Responsibilities, Recommendation that the United States 
Government Accede to the Rome Statute of the Int’l Crim. Ct., at 5–9 (Feb. 19, 2001), http://www.icc 
now.org/documents/ABARes_onUSFeb01.pdf (highlighting the Rome Statute is consistent with the 
Bill of Rights, due process protections for Americans, and against baseless prosecutions by the ICC 
Prosecutor); see also Sam Sasan Shoamanesh, The ICC and the Middle East: A Needed Relationship, 
JURIST FORUM (Sept. 24, 2009), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/jclc/backissues/v98/n3/ 
9803_983.Scheffer_Cox.pdf. 
 119. SAIS JOHN HOPKINS US-ICC REPORT, supra note 7, at 26 (“If the ICC poses a threat to US 
sovereignty it is much more a symbolic rather than an effective one”); Gallarotti & Preis, supra note 
13, at 30 (“It would appear that U.S. opposition to the Court is founded on exaggerated perceptions of 
the Court’s potential threat to U.S. national interests, and that therefore the downside risks for the U.S. 
created by the existence of the Court are not great.”). 
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prosecution.120 The ICC jurisdictional regime is very deferential and non-
invasive to its member States, especially those with highly sophisticated 
and international justice conscious domestic judiciaries like that of the 
U.S.—were it to join.121 Additionally, temporal jurisdiction only starts 
after the date of ratification, so all alleged past crimes would not be within 
the ICC’s jurisdiction.122 New ratifying States can also remove war crimes 
from the Court’s potential jurisdiction for a seven year period.123 Finally, 
as a matter of practice, the ICC has shown that its prosecutorial strategy 
and decision-making is not motivated by politics, contrary to early 
American concerns about political prosecutions.124 The ICC has a 
substantial set of de jure and de facto checks and balances that ensure that 
only meritorious cases go forward and that States are given every 
opportunity to assert their jurisdiction.125 
2. Enhancing the U.S.’s Ability to Influence Positive Change 
The most compelling argument for greater U.S. engagement with the 
ICC is the added value to a multitude of U.S. policy interests. Broadly 
speaking, the strengthening of U.S. support for, and regularization of its 
engagement with, the Court will significantly contribute to U.S. influence 
in numerous arenas. 
For decades, the pedigree of American leadership on human rights and 
international rule of law was unquestioned.126 The U.S. trumpeted the 
importance of human rights and rule of law, and fostered great 
 
 
 120. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 15 (Pretrial Chamber oversight of Prosecutor); art. 17(1)(a–
d) (principle of complementarity and gravity threshold). 
 121. Scheffer & Cox, supra note 118, at 1003; ASIL US-ICC Task Force, supra note 115, at 44 
(“It must not be forgotten that a properly functioning complementarity regime ensures that the ICC 
only has jurisdiction to try Americans if the United States does not or cannot exercise its primary 
jurisdiction.”). 
 122. Id. art. 11(2). 
 123. Id. art. 124. 
 124. Koh & Rapp, supra note 54 (commenting that the track record of the ICC has not shown 
political taint); Wes Rist, The Conservative Case for the International Criminal Court Six Years In, 
JURIST (July 30, 2008), http://jurist.org/forum/2008/07/conservative-case-for-international.php; John 
Bellinger III, Congress Should Review Policies Toward War Crimes Court, WASH. POST (June 21, 
2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/congress-should-review-policies-toward-war-crimes-court/2012 
/06/21/gJQAN9RgtV_story_1.html (“The court has proved less threatening to U.S. personnel and 
interests than many Americans first feared.”). 
 125. Shoamanesh, supra note 118. 
 126. President Jimmy Carter, Op-ed, A Cruel and Unusual Record, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2012, at 
A19 (discussing the U.S. leadership on human rights and the impact it has had); Vincent Warren, 
Supreme Court Holds U.S. Rights Legacy in the Balance, CNN (Sept. 27, 2012), http://edition.cnn. 
com/2012/09/27/opinion/warren-supreme-court-alien-tort-law (explaining the historical significance of 
U.S. leadership on human rights).  
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advancements in these fields around the world by making them foreign 
policy priorities.127 However, the American trumpet does not move others 
like it has in the past. Given the unfortunate increase in need for 
advancements in human rights and rule of law around the globe,128 the 
U.S. cannot take for granted opportunities to bolster its reputation and 
expertise. There is not a more visible and striking venue where the U.S. 
can dramatically reaffirm as well as resurrect its “smart” and “soft” 
power129 than at the ICC.130 
If the U.S. were to remove existing barriers to a more open and 
supportive relationship with the ICC, it would take an important first step 
in correcting the aforementioned paradox of the U.S. not being a formal 
part of the ICC. This course correction would also mitigate the damage 
caused by the most tangible item that others point towards when seeking 
to undercut American creditability in human rights and the rule of law: 
U.S. non-ratification of the Rome Statute.131 
By breaking new ground on U.S.-ICC relations, new avenues of 
influence that are currently shut to the U.S. will emerge as well. For 
example, the U.S. does not find any challenge or threat from the existing 
ICC cases with an arrest warrant, and actually finds these cases to be in its 
foreign policy and national interests.132 By removing domestic and 
symbolic barriers to support of the ICC, the U.S. would gain greater 
leverage with other countries that it is trying to persuade to cooperate with 
the Court on these cases.133  
Achieving concrete progress in U.S.-ICC relations is a condition 
precedent to ratification of the Rome Statue, which would present an even 
more monumental opportunity for U.S. to solidify its reputation as a 
 
 
 127. Carter, supra note 126.  
 128. See, e.g., Rami G. Khouri, The Arab Awakening, THE NATION (Aug. 24, 2011), http://www 
.thenation.com/article/162973/arab-awakening (example of unprecedented worldwide opportunity for 
advancement of human rights and the rule of law).  
 129. Tysha Bohorquez, Review, “Soft Power—The Means to Success in World Politics,” UCLA 
INT’L INST. (Dec. 1, 2005), http://www.international.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=34734. 
 130. See COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT OF AN INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE, FINDING 
AMERICA’S VOICE: A STRATEGY FOR REINVIGORATING U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 30–31 (Sept. 2003), 
http://www.cfr.org/us-strategy-and-politics/finding-americas-voice/p6261. 
 131. See Jim Lobe, Bush ‘Unsigns’ War Crimes Treaty (May 5, 2002), http://www.alternet.org/ 
story/13055/bush_’unsigns’_war_crimes_treaty (quoting numerous experts on how the U.S. non-
ratification and “unsigning” of the Rome Statute hurts the U.S. reputation in international affairs).  
 132. Interview by Geraldine Coughlan with Stephen Rapp, U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War 
Crimes, U.S. Supports International Justice, INT’L JUSTICE TRIBUNE, Mar. 30, 2011, at 4 [hereinafter 
Rapp Interview], available at http://sites.rnw.nl/pdf/ijt/ijt125.pdf. 
 133. SAIS JOHN HOPKINS US-ICC REPORT, supra note 7, at 109, 116, 117; Megan Fairlie, The 
United States and the International Criminal Court Post-Bush: A Beautiful Courtship but an Unlikely 
Marriage, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 528, 542–43, 572 (2012). 
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human rights and rule of law champion.134 Specifically, if sufficient 
progress were made for the U.S. to ratify, it would motivate other 
countries to join the ICC family (e.g., Turkey, other Middle Eastern allies) 
and force others to consider ratification in order not to be outflanked (e.g., 
China, Russia, India).135 The cascading effect of American membership in 
the ICC would provide an enormous boost to U.S. credentials as well as 
the universality of the Rome Statute and the fight against impunity.136 
3. Bolster U.S. Support of Global Rule of Law  
Broadening and regularizing U.S.-ICC relations will profoundly 
enhance the establishment of the rule of law around the world, a long-held 
objective of the U.S.137 By and through such federal agencies as the U.S. 
Agency for International Development, the U.S. has, over decades, 
contributed substantial resources around the world to support the rule of 
law and the protection of human rights.138 As previously mentioned, the 
Rome Statute is structured to defer to proven domestic judiciaries that 
have the political will to investigate and prosecute international atrocity 
crimes.139 Yet, the inverse is also true in that the Rome Statute legal 
regime permits the ICC to intervene in countries with a weak criminal 
justice infrastructure or with little to no political drive to investigate and 
prosecute international atrocity crimes.140 Accordingly, the ICC regime 
incentivizes developing countries to build up their judicial and political 
apparatuses in order to achieve similar deference from the ICC.141 Were 
 
 
 134. JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., US POLICY REGARDING THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 29 (2006). 
 135. See SAIS JOHN HOPKINS US-ICC REPORT, supra note 7, at 99 (discussing the ability of 
States to influence each other’s international legal behavior).  
 136. Stacy, Scheffer, et al., International Rights Prosecution by 2022, GLOBAL BRIEF (Feb. 6, 
2012), http://globalbrief.ca/blog/2012/02/06/what-will-have-been-the-consequences-of-international-
human-rights-prosecutions-by-2022/. 
 137. USAID History, USAID (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/usaid-history.  
 138. Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance, USAID, http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/ 
democracy-human-rights-and-governance (last visited Feb. 11, 2013); Where We Work, USAID, 
http://www .usaid.gov/where-we-work (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).  
 139. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Carey Shenkman, Catalyzing National Judicial Capacity: The ICC’s First Crimes Against 
Humanity Outside Armed Conflict, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1239 (2012), available at http://www.nyu 
lawreview.org/sites/default/files/pdf/NYULawReview-87-4-Shenkman.pdf; William W. Burke-White, 
Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome 
System of International Justice, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53, 57–58, 69, 87 (2008); Marieke Wierda, 
Briefing, The Potential of Complementarity, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (Sept. 2009), 
http://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Global-ICC-Complementarity-2009-English.pdf (“Even if 
the motivation is to avoid the ICC, the pursuit of domestic criminal justice conducted to an 
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the U.S. to commit to helping build the ICC as an institution, as well as 
commit diplomatically and politically to the Rome Statute regime, it 
would also be a lift to its long-standing effort to develop the rule of law in 
countries around the world.  
4. Support U.S. Interest in Atrocity Prevention & the Institution of 
Peace 
In addition to long-standing security and regional interests in 
preventing conflicts, the U.S. has made it a strategic and moral 
responsibility to prevent atrocities. In 2011, President Obama issued a 
presidential study directive to assess and suggest reforms needed for the 
formation of an Atrocity Prevention Board that would acclimate 
governmental entities towards detecting signs of atrocities and deploying 
resources to prevent their perpetration or continuation.142 In this respect, it 
is readily apparent that long-term prevention requires credible 
accountability mechanisms.143 For instance, in domestic criminal justice 
settings, crime prevention is accomplished through education, persuasion, 
and restricting access to resources, but also through the threat of police 
investigation and judicial consequences.144 In 2012, the National Security 
Advisor’s report to President Obama arrived at a similar conclusion, 
stating that “accountability” was an essential component of preventing 
atrocities.145 
The U.S. also has an interest in stopping atrocities and instituting 
lasting peace in their wake. In this regard, evidence exists that indictments, 
or even the specter of them, can hasten the end of atrocities and stigmatize 
individuals contributing to the violence, provided that international 
pressure and support to back these measures exists as well.146 Furthermore, 
 
 
international standard and the development of new domestic capacities should be seen as overall 
gains.”). 
 142. Press Release, The White House, Presidential Study Directive on Mass Atrocities (Aug. 4, 
2011) [hereinafter Press Release, Presidential Study], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2011/08/04/presidential-study-directive-mass-atrocities. 
 143. Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future 
Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 7, 12 (2001), available at http://www.asil.org/ajil/recon2.pdf. 
 144. See ABA, Standards on Prosecutorial Investigations, Standard 2.1(c)(v), http://www. 
americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_standards_pinvestigate.html (last 
visited Aug. 19, 2013). 
 145. Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: A Comprehensive Strategy and New Tools to 
Prevent and Respond to Atrocities (Apr. 23, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2012/04/23/fact-sheet-comprehensive-strategy-and-new-tools-prevent-and-respond-atro. 
 146. Emily C. Barbour & Matthew C. Weed, The International Criminal Court (ICC): 
Jurisdiction, Extradition, and U.S. Policy, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., at 24 (Mar. 16, 2010), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss3/16
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the imposition of accountability measures, either during or after conflicts, 
have been shown to foster lasting peace across borders as well as societies 
more adherent to human rights, rule of law, and democracy.147 By 
systematically supporting the ICC as an institution, its cooperation-based 
regime, and the positive benefits of its jurisdiction, the U.S. would gain a 
dependable partner in preventing atrocities, ending violence, and 
instituting peace. 
Furthermore, more robust U.S. support of the ICC is a cost-effective 
way to support both worldwide atrocity prevention and the development of 
rule of law in domestic jurisdictions. Specifically, breaking down barriers 
to large-scale investments in the ICC would consolidate U.S. resources, as 
such investments would be going towards both the fortification of an 
effective international safeguard needed for long-term atrocity prevention, 
as well as the creation of incentives for domestic jurisdictions to build up 
their own political and judicial capacities to address international atrocity 
crimes.  
5. Allow the U.S. to Influence ICC’s Development  
Much of the discussion thus far has focused on improving the U.S.-ICC 
relationship to a point short of ratification. Some believe that a very 
cooperative non-State Party position is the most advisable, not to mention 
the best feasible posture considering that U.S. ratification is not realistic in 
the immediate future.148 Frankly, it is true that improvements to the U.S.-
ICC relationship need to occur before an open and legitimate conversation 
about ratification can take place at all in the U.S.149 It is also true that the 
U.S. could benefit greatly by simply having a strong relationship of trust 
and support with the Court as a non-State Party and nothing more.150 Yet, 
 
 
http://www.amicc.org/docs/R41116_20100316.pdf; Jacqueline Geis & Alex Mundt, When to Indict? 
The Impact of Timing of International Criminal Indictments on Peace Processes and Humanitarian 
Action, THE BROOKINGS INST.-UNIV. OF BERN PROJECT ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT, at 15–19 (Feb. 
2009) [hereinafter Brookings Report], http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/ 
4/peace%20and%20justice%20geis/04_peace_and_justice_geis; Akhavan, supra note 143, at 9; Aryeh 
Neier, A President in the Dock, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Mar. 9, 2009), http://www.project-syndicate. 
org/commentary/a-president-in-the-dock. 
 147. KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS PROSECUTIONS ARE 
CHANGING WORLD POLITICS 177–99 (2011). 
 148. Vijay Padmanabhan, From Rome to Kampala: The U.S. Approach to the 2010 International 
Criminal Court Review Conference (Apr. 2010), http://www.cfr.org/international-criminal-courts-and-
tribunals/rome-kampala/p21934. 
 149. ASIL US-ICC Task Force, supra note 115, at 23–24.  
 150. See David Scheffer, America’s Embrace of the International Criminal Court, JURIST (July 2, 
2012), http://jurist.org/forum/2012/06/dan-scheffer-us-icc.php (discussing that at the very least, de 
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these benefits are limited, and it is not in the U.S.’s short or long-term 
interest to maintain an indefinite non-State Party status.151 The full extent 
of all the aforementioned and other benefits requires ratification. 
While the primary attractions of membership for the U.S. are positive 
in nature, one of the other main motivating factors for U.S. ratification has 
to be the long-term negative consequences if the U.S. does not join. After 
the Rome Statute’s passage in 1998,152 and in the early years of its 
operation,153 there was a common belief that the ICC would flounder 
without formal U.S. support.154 After ten years of operations with some 
notable successes, it is evident that the Court is here to stay.155 Although 
far from flawless, the international community has proven that it can put 
together and run an international tribunal without formal U.S. 
involvement. The Court will surely improve over time with or without the 
U.S.’s support, albeit not as quickly or surely as with it. What should 
alarm the U.S., therefore, is not the inevitability of the ICC’s existence 
without the U.S., but the inevitability of its success without the U.S. Thus, 
for the U.S. to enjoy the benefits of the ICC’s success, as it did at the 
ICTY,156 it must revisit ratification at some point in a concerted and 
earnest fashion.  
 
 
facto membership is a “win-win” for the U.S. and the ICC). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Douglass Cassel, The Rome Treaty for an International Criminal Court: A Flawed but 
Essential First Step, 6 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 41, 42 (1999), available at http://www.iccnow.org/ 
documents/CasselRomeTreaty.pdf (“Before going into effect, the treaty must be ratified by 60 states. 
Especially in view of U.S. opposition, that will take years, at minimum.); Michael Montgomery, The 
United States Versus the International Criminal Court, AMERICAN RADIOWORKS, http://american 
radioworks.publicradio.org/features/justiceontrial/icc.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2013) (expressing 
“surprise” that the requisite 60 ratifications occurred so quickly when so many thoughts it would take 
“years”). 
 153. See Hussein Solomon, ICC Needs U.S. Support, BITTERLEMONS-INTERNATIONAL (Aug. 14, 
2008), http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/inside.php?id=980 (inferring that the “absence of the 
U.S.” at the ICC could “damn” it like it did to the League of Nations).  
 154. Jack Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 
(2003). 
 155. Fairlie, supra note 133, at 548; David Crane, International Law Symposium Keynote 
Address: When You Get to the Fork in the Road, Take It: Reflections on Fifteen Years of Developments 
in Modern International Criminal Law, 8 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 1, 9 (2010).  
 156. The ICTY is a helpful explanatory parallel. Like the ICC, after ten years of its existence, 
there were significant criticisms of its work on many levels. Claude Jorda, The Major Hurdles and 
Accomplishments of the ICTY: What the ICC Can Learn From Them, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 572, 582 
(2004); Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Problems, Obstacles and Achievements of the ICTY, 2 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 558, 559–67 (2004); Stuart Ford, The ICC Turns Ten: Evolution and Development, JURIST 
(July 6, 2012), http://jurist.org/forum/2012/06/dan-scheffer-us-icc.php. Yet today, roughly twenty 
years after its creation, the ICTY has arrested or otherwise addressed all of its 161 indictees. Press 
Release, Office of the Prosecutor, Statement of the Office of the Prosecutor, Int’l Crim. Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia on the Arrest of Goran Hadžić (July 20, 2011), available at http://www.icty. 
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This point is particularly important as the advantages of the U.S.’s “de 
facto” membership only go so far.157 The real benefits of membership 
reside within the ICC family. Primarily, U.S. ratification would result in 
acquiring a vote in the ASP, the ICC’s legislative and governing body.158 
More than just the ability to cast a single vote, the U.S. can marshal its 
voting power to persuade other countries more forcefully than its current 
observer role permits. As a voting member, it could better sway other 
countries on the wide range of critically important topics addressed by the 
ASP, such as amendments to the ICC law and procedures and the selection 
of the most qualified ICC judges and prosecutors.159 Likewise, as a State 
Party, the U.S. would also have a more meaningful dialogue with the 
Court and other State Parties on a number of essential operational and 
administrative issues.160 Lastly, only from within the ICC can the U.S. best 
address others regarding its main concerns, namely prosecution 
strategies.161 
6. Ensure American Human Capacity and Competence in 
International Criminal Law 
The most overlooked problem with U.S. non-ratification of the Rome 
Statute, and deeply related to the section immediately above, is the 
institutional and symbolic restrictions it places on American judges, 
prosecutors, lawyers, and other staff from working at the ICC.162 There are 
currently multiple American prosecutors, lawyers, visiting professionals, 
and interns at the ICC; however, the future presence of Americans at the 
ICC is far from a foregone conclusion.  
 
 
org/sid/10734. The Tribunal is also considered a resounding success for accountability and 
international criminal law. Nancy Amoury Combs, Legitimizing International Criminal Justice: The 
Importance of Process Control, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 321, 324–25 (2012). In comparison, the ICC has 
a far larger mandate in many respects than the ICTY, which means its potential impact is also far 
larger. Concededly, the ICTY had the strong backing of the U.S., but with 121 committed State Parties 
and a growing presence on the international stage, the ICC will inevitably evolve and improve along 
the way. 
 157. Scheffer, supra note 150. 
 158. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 112 (7).  
 159. Id. arts. 36, 42, 51; Gallarotti & Preis, supra note 13, at 4, 17; Kip Hale, The Price We Must 
Pay for International Criminal Justice, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 19, 2012), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kip-hale/international-criminal-court-funding_b_2149834.html. 
 160. A.B.A., Recommendation that the United States Government Accede to the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, at 1 (2001), available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/ 
ABARes_ onUSFeb01.pdf. 
 161. Risch, supra note 21, at 11.  
 162. See infra note 163.  
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Despite a regulatory preference for applicants from State Parties,163 
American lawyers and other professionals are hired by the Court based 
upon their degrees from the well-respected American legal and graduate 
education system, work experience in highly sophisticated American 
public and private enterprises (e.g., law firms and U.S. Attorney offices) 
and, most importantly, unique experience working on similarly 
complicated international criminal cases at UN ad hoc and hybrid 
international tribunals. Due to substantial U.S. support of these other 
tribunals, Americans generally have more experience in the practice of 
international criminal law than most other nationalities.164 These uniquely 
similar experiences have ensured American candidates a place at the ICC, 
because these other tribunals are unparalleled training and proving 
grounds for ICC work. 
Yet, Americans will not long maintain this expertise at present course. 
First, American advanced education and law firm experiences are not 
limited to Americans. More acutely, the other international criminal 
tribunals, while operational for many years, are only temporary and set to 
close in the next several years.165 The pool of opportunities to gain 
international criminal experience is narrowing for professionals of all 
nationalities, as a result. Inversely, ICC positions become increasingly 
more competitive. Ten years from now, the ICC will likely be the only 
international criminal tribunal in existence, and one that still prefers hiring 
applicants from State Parties. Without the opportunity to gain useful 
experience from the other international criminal tribunals, the justification 
to employ Americans at the ICC despite the regulatory preference will 
cease, and the number of Americans at the ICC will dwindle steadily. 
The practical repercussions of U.S. non-State Party status will extend 
beyond negatively impacting the number of jobs that Americans can get at 
the ICC. With opportunities in international criminal law becoming fewer 
than for most other nationalities, the next generation of internationally 
experienced American judges, prosecutors, attorneys, and other 
 
 
 163. ICC-ASP Res., Staff Regulations of the International Criminal Court, Annex to the 
Resolution (4), ICC-ASP/2/Res.2 (Sept. 12, 2003), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/3119BD70-
DFB6-4B8C-BC17-3019CC1D0E21/140182/Staff_Regulations_120704EN.pdf.  
 164. See, e.g., Press Release, Int’l Crim. Ct., ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda appoints Patricia 
Sellers, Leila Sadat and Diane Marie Amann as Special Advisers (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/news%20and%20highlights/Pages/pr8
61.aspx (all three special advisers are American); Press Release, Harvard Univ. Law School, Whiting 
to Join International Criminal Court (July 13, 2010), http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2010/07/13_ 
whiting.icc.html. 
 165. Valerie Oosterveld, The International Criminal Court and the Closure of the Time-Limited 
International and Hybrid Criminal Tribunals, 8 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 13, 13–14 (2010).  
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professionals will be far fewer in number and lower in competence. 
Furthermore, it is these professionals with experience in the practice of 
international criminal law that become competent, informed advisors to 
the U.S. government on international criminal justice and related matters. 
Stephen Rapp, the current U.S. Ambassador at large for Global Criminal 
Justice who has extensive working experience at the ICTR and SCSL, is a 
perfect example.166 Ten to twenty years from now the U.S. government 
will not have such informed advisors as Ambassador Rapp at its disposal.  
The most costly ramification is that the U.S. government will simply 
have no human connection to the ICC. The lack of Americans at the ICC 
will make the Court appear progressively more and more foreign and 
distant to the U.S. government, and also give it limited, if any, means to 
gain insight into the ICC. For the U.S. to avoid this “brain drain” in 
international criminal law, it must work towards greater engagement with, 
and ultimately membership in, the ICC. 
B. Reasons for the ICC to Improve Relations with the U.S. 
1. Gain Robust and Unique U.S. Support 
Thus far, the previously discussed benefits of a more open and 
supportive relationship between the U.S. and the ICC has centered on 
added value to the U.S. The ICC, however, has much to gain from such 
improvements to the relationship as well, including possible future U.S. 
ratification. As discussed, the ICC is no different than any other 
international institution in that it is the sum of its parts. Said differently, it 
is generally as good as the quality of the support it receives from States. 
This reality does not mean the ICC is fully at the whim of States or fails to 
contribute to its own perpetuation or future. Nonetheless, it remains true 
that the ICC depends on States, especially given that it requires States to 
carry out its core criminal enforcement functions.167 
Accordingly, the ICC has a vested interest in building up the U.S.-ICC 
relationship, and in the long term, the ratification of one of, if not, the 
world’s most dynamically powerful countries. The U.S. government and 
its people offer a comprehensive array of diplomatic, financial, political, 
human, and logistical resources that, if fully dedicated to the ICC and its 
 
 
 166. Biography: Stephen J. Rapp, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/ 
129455.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2013). 
 167. Rene Blattmann & Kirsten Bowman, Achievements and Problems of the International 
Criminal Court, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 722, 723 (2008).  
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processes, would significantly increase the Court’s overall effectiveness 
and efficiency in carrying out its lofty mandate.168 The real world benefits 
to the ICC would be numerous: U.S. financial contributions would be an 
immense boost to the ICC’s underfunded budget;169 American diplomatic 
pressure and political support of the ICC would contribute prominently to 
the systematic increase in cooperation and support to the Court from 
countries around the world;170 and U.S. logistical, intelligence, military, 
and human resources that would be assigned to assist ICC investigations, 
prosecutions, and adjudications would immediately raise the quality and 
outcomes of such ICC activities.171 
Of course, aside from direct financial support, the ICC can receive 
several types of support from the U.S. given its ad hoc, “case-by-case” 
arrangement with the Court.172 For instance, the U.S. has helped, inter 
alia, in investigative, witness protection, and fugitive apprehension 
matters.173 Despite this fact, the relationship still remains ad hoc and case-
by-case, subject to fundamental change at any moment. Moreover, it 
means that the U.S.—unlike its relationship with the UN ad hoc and 
internationalized tribunals—is not deeply invested in the success of the 
ICC or its activities. While it is not the sole burden of the ICC to persuade 
the U.S. to improve their relationship and potentially ratify the Rome 
Statute, it is imperative that the U.S. understands that its sustained non-
State Party status is neither in its interest—as stated above—nor in the 
interest of the international criminal justice movement. While the U.S. 
efforts to institute a culture of accountability in and outside of the ICC are 
laudable,174 a fragmented system of international criminal justice benefits 
no one. The ICC and its core doctrine of complementarity comprise the 
 
 
 168. Gallarotti & Preis, supra note 13, at 1, 29 n.65; Am. Soc’y of Int’l Law, Transcript, Release 
of the ASIL Task Force on the ICC Report [hereinafter ASIL Report Transcript], http://www.asil.org 
/files/ASILTaskForce032709Transcript.pdf (last visited Aug. 19, 2013) (discussing the report’s 
conclusions, which includes statements from Patricia Wald, former ICTY judge, and David Tolbert, 
former ICTY senior official, about the importance of the U.S.’s unique resources to the ICTY’s 
effectiveness and efficiency that the ICC could greatly use). 
 169. Rebecca Hamilton, Member Countries Fight over International Court’s Budget, REUTERS 
(Dec. 11, 2011), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2011/12_-_December/ Member_ 
countries_fight_over_international_court_s_budget/. 
 170. ASIL Report Transcript, supra note 168. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Ambassador Stephen J. Rapp, Statement by the United States of America to the Assembly of 
States Parties of the International Criminal Court (Nov. 15, 2012) (transcript available at http://www 
.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP11/GenDeba/ICC-ASP11-GenDeba-USA-ENG.pdf); Harold Hongju 
Koh, Keynote Justice Address at the Vera Institution of Justice, The Paley Center (Nov. 8, 2012) 
(transcript available at http://www.vera.org/files/harold-koh-justice-address-2012.pdf). 
 173. See supra note 172. 
 174. See id. 
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consensus system in place, and the sooner the U.S. is convinced that it 
should be a formal and/or proactive member of that system, the sooner it 
will benefit the ICC and international community.175 
V. BREAKING THE CIRCLE 
Having discussed the benefits that each would derive from greater 
cooperation and a more sustained relationship, we now turn to practical 
changes that can be implemented to bring about perceptible change to the 
U.S.-ICC circular conundrum. Stalemates are, by definition, notoriously 
hard to resolve with this cyclical issue being no different: the U.S. will not 
invest its resources in full until the ICC gets better, which the ICC cannot 
do easily without the help of States like the U.S. Typically, such impasses 
are fixed by a radical, overnight change that reconfigures the equation, 
forcing the actors to reassess.176 However, the U.S.-ICC conundrum is 
unlikely to see such a radical shift.177 The U.S. will not become an 
unabashed ICC advocate, let alone a State Party, with all things staying the 
same. Likewise, the ICC will not quickly become a vastly improved 
institution with all things staying the same. Without a doubt, the ICC has 
more than sufficient backing to develop and cultivate greater international 
support, yet that day would certainly come far more rapidly with the full 
support and investment of a country like the U.S. 
Instead, it is preferable to chart a course that elevates U.S.-ICC 
relations to new heights and does so sooner rather than later. One such 
possible course requires both the U.S. and ICC to take “incremental leaps 
of faiths” towards each other and towards the betterment of the 
relationship. These incremental leaps are steps that are meaningful and 
demonstrate real change, but are politically achievable and acceptable in a 
still delicate relationship. These signs of good faith will both allow for real 
change in the relationship, yet also test the proverbial waters politically to 
explore further progress, the latter being especially relevant for the U.S. 
The timing is right for such incremental changes. President Obama, 
who improved relations with the ICC in his first term, was elected to a 
 
 
 175. SAIS JOHN HOPKINS US-ICC REPORT, supra note 7, at 95, 115–16.  
 176. For example, the Reagan Administration ratified the Genocide Convention 40 years after the 
U.S. signed the convention, only after a public relations disaster committed by his administration. 
SAMANTHA POWER, “A PROBLEM FROM HELL”: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 161–63 
(Harper Perennial ed., 2003). 
 177. Fairlie, supra note 133, at 558–60; John Washburn & Matthew Heaphy, US Participation in 
ICC Review Conference Indicates New Supportive Policy, JURIST (Jan. 30, 2010), http://jurist.org/hot 
line/2010/01/us-participation-in-icc-review.php; see ASIL US-ICC Task Force, supra note 115, at 41. 
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second term, and his administration can use the next two years to build up 
enough momentum to accomplish progress. The ICC has continued to 
establish itself on the international stage with cases that the U.S. supports. 
Additionally, the ICC has a new Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, who has the 
ability to soothe uneasy minds in Washington D.C. and overly cautious 
ones in The Hague.178 
A. Recommendations to the U.S. 
1. Remove the Bolton Letter 
Currently, the Bolton letter serves as the footnote to the U.S.’s 
signature on the Rome Statute, and reads as follows: 
This is to inform you, in connection with the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court adopted on July 17, 1998, that the 
United States does not intend to become a party to the treaty. 
Accordingly, the United States has no legal obligations arising from 
its signature on December 31, 2000. The United States requests that 
its intention not to become a party, as expressed in this letter, be 
reflected in the depositary’s status lists relating to this treaty.179 
Read in conjunction with Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties that obligates States that have signed a treaty to “refrain from 
acts which would defeat the object and purpose” of that treaty,180 the 
Bolton letter effectively states that the U.S. need not refrain from defeating 
the object and purpose of the Rome Statute, which is to end impunity for 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.181 The U.S.’s words 
and actions are contrary to this legal nuance. For that reason alone, the 
letter deserves to be withdrawn or otherwise nullified.182 
For the U.S., however, removing the Bolton letter carries political 
risks. The executive decision to remove the letter would befall the 
 
 
 178. Rick Gladstone, A Lifelong Passion Is Now Put to Practice in The Hague, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
18, 2013, at A7; Mark Kersten, The ICC Got an African Prosecutor: Does it Matter?, JUSTICE IN 
CONFLICT (Jan. 5, 2012), http://justiceinconflict.org/2012/01/05/the-iccs-got-an-african-prosecutor-
does-it-matter/. 
 179. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3, http:// 
treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20II/Chapter%20XVIII/XVIII-10.en.pdf (copy of the 
Rome Statute with footnotes); Bolton Letter, supra note 57. 
 180. Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf. 
 181. Rome Statute, supra note 2, pmbl.  
 182. Bolton Letter, supra note 57.  
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common, yet weak refrain against President Obama that he acts without 
consulting others.183 It also increases the risk of inflaming those within the 
U.S. that are vehemently opposed to anything “international” and find 
such multilateral efforts to be an assault on U.S. sovereignty.184 
Conversely, cautious proponents of the ICC in the U.S. may advise that 
the U.S. can avoid these political concerns altogether, because there is no 
legal need to pull the letter.185 If and when the U.S. decides to be a State 
Party, it could submit its letter of accession to the Rome Statute with the 
U.N. and simultaneously include its repudiation of the Bolton letter. 
This advice, however, overlooks two considerations. First, it 
presupposes that the U.S. joining the ICC will come in one fell swoop as 
opposed to a slow build up, an especially tenuous assumption when U.S. 
history of joining treaties militates towards the latter.186 Second, 
withdrawing the Bolton letter presents a political opportunity for President 
Obama to frame the debate. On this point, the ICC’s international justice 
mission enjoys conceptual support from both sides of the political aisle in 
the U.S.187 It is only a vocal minority of reflexive anti-internationalists and 
its ability to raise the concerns of others—particularly the U.S. military 
brass—through misinformation that is behind the perceived undercurrent 
of anti-ICC sentiment in the U.S.188 President Obama has the advantage of 
choosing a time for the letter’s removal, as well as the time to fashion a 
strong statement to frame the debate and neutralize opposition—a strong 
suit of his. Accordingly, this suggested manner of handling the Bolton 
letter would not only be feasible, but also has all the makings of a political 
win for the President. 
 
 
 183. See, e.g., Obama, GOP Trade Barbs in Health Care Fight, CNN (July 20, 2009), http:// 
edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/07/20/health.reform/index.html (complaining that Obama did not 
“reach out” to GOP).  
 184. See, e.g., Brett D. Schaefer & Steven Groves, The ICC Review Conference: A Threat to U.S. 
Interests, HERITAGE FOUNDATION: BACKGROUNDER (May 28, 2010), http://www.heritage.org/ 
research/reports/2010/05/the-icc-review-conference-a-threat-to-us-interests. 
 185. See Curtis A. Bradley, U.S. Announces Intent Not to Ratify International Criminal Court 
Treaty, ASIL INSIGHTS (May 2002), http://www.asil.org/insigh87.cfm (implying that the Bolton letter 
is only an expression not to ratify, but does not bind the U.S. to refrain from ratifying).  
 186. The U.S. has a track record of taking decades to ratify treaties that it signs. Jenny S. 
Martinez, There are Two Ways at Looking at Sovereignty, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2012), http://www.ny 
times.com/roomfordebate/2012/12/06/have-treaties-gone-out-of-style/with-un-treaties-there-are-two-
ways-to-look-at-sovereignty. 
 187. For example, eighteen U.S. Senators, both Republican and Democratic, encouraged President 
Clinton to sign the Rome Statute. Letter from U.S. Senators to President William J. Clinton (Dec. 21, 
2000), available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/Senate12_00.pdf. 
 188. Schaefer & Groves, supra note 184; More Bad Anti-ICC Arguments, FOREIGN POLICY ASS’N 
(Aug. 20, 2010), http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2010/08/20/more-bad-anti-icc-arguments/ (demonstrating 
the reflexive nature of anti-ICC arguments and that this reflects the minority of Americans). 
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If the U.S. were to withdraw or otherwise nullify the Bolton letter, it 
would send a clear message to the international community that the U.S.-
ICC relationship has a firmer foundation than its current ad hoc 
arrangement. Eliminating the Bolton letter to the Secretary-General of the 
UN would not only have symbolic significance for the U.S.-ICC 
relationship, but would recognize the Court in a formal manner and legally 
reinstate the U.S. intention to ratify.189 Additionally, it would help 
undercut those who assail the reputation of the U.S. as a global leader on 
human rights and rule of law.190 Lastly, as it would only require the 
consent of the Obama administration, re-activating the U.S. signature on 
the Rome Statute—while not completely devoid of politics—would be 
practically very achievable.191  
2. Develop Positive U.S. Interagency Policy on the ICC 
At present, the U.S. government does not have a policy that guides the 
U.S. executive branch, and its multitude of agencies, on the ICC. A 
government-wide policy that promotes the ICC and the relevant U.S. 
interests would certainly add political and diplomatic value to the U.S.-
ICC relationship. The true value, however, would be from the process of 
the policy’s creation and the subsequent benefit of the entire U.S. 
government making decisions from the same positive policy statement.192 
The various executive branch agencies—notably the White House, 
State Department, Department of Justice, and Department of Defense—
have taken varied positions on the ICC, sometimes at odds with each 
other.193 Effective improvements to U.S.-ICC relations require that the 
U.S. government create a forum for opposing views within the 
government to be aired, misunderstandings corrected where they exist, and 
agreements forged.194 The process of developing an interagency policy is 
that opportunity. Furthermore, with a government as large, diverse, and 
 
 
 189. While the U.S. could simply accede to the Rome Statute in one step, removing the Bolton 
letter would have the added benefit of reinstating the U.S.’ intention to ratify. Aurélie Coppin, Status 
of the U.S. Signature on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, AM. NON-GOV. ORGS. 
COAL. FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT. (Sept. 11, 2008), http://www.amicc.org/docs/US_Signature.pdf. 
 190. Luke A. McLaurin, Can the President “Unsign” a Treaty? A Constitutional Inquiry, 84 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1941, 1976 (2006); Risch, supra note 21, at 2, 12; SAIS JOHN HOPKINS US-ICC 
REPORT, supra note 7, at 104. 
 191. ASIL US-ICC Task Force, supra note 115, at 29–32 (explaining that the President can 
unilaterally reverse course on the “unsigning” Bolton letter).  
 192. Id. at 23–24.  
 193. Scheffer, supra note 8, at 163–98 (detailing the numerous positions taken by various agencies 
in the lead up and during the Rome conference in 1998).  
 194. See id.  
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interconnected as the U.S. government, the outcome of such an exercise 
allows the U.S. government to speak with one voice on the U.S.-ICC 
relationship and help coordinate cross-agency consistency in its activities 
relevant to the ICC. This unified voice will clearly identify the 
government’s view on the positives as well as the remaining concerns with 
the ICC and the relationship writ large, and also ensure control over 
relations with the ICC that cautious minds in the U.S. would want.195  
The current timing could not be better for the government to shape 
such an interagency policy. Specifically, the government is already 
undergoing a consensus bridging and policy forming exercise on a subject 
matter perfectly on point: the Atrocity Prevention Board. After 
announcing the recommendations of the National Security Advisor’s 
review, there has been a government-wide effort to develop and 
institutionalize “an effective atrocity prevention and response strategy.”196 
Creating this kind of “strategy” is a perfect opportunity for various 
government actors to come together to define a policy and establish how 
the U.S. will interact with the ICC. Lastly, and most importantly, the 
reputation and knowledge of the ICC is at an all-time high in the U.S. 
government, particularly with the recent expansion of the U.S. Rewards 
for Justice Program to include ICC indictees.197 It is important that a U.S. 
inter-agency policy on the ICC be comprehensively supportive, accurate, 
and overall positive towards the Court. Now is the best political time to 
attain such a pro-ICC policy.198  
3. Eliminate Anti-ICC Legislation  
The effects of President George W. Bush administration’s attack on the 
ICC, as described above, are still felt in the form of a mosaic of anti-ICC 
legislation. Fortunately, in the latter part of his presidency, President Bush 
signed into law several repeals of anti-ICC legislation.199 Nonetheless, two 
primary pieces of anti-ICC legislation remain: ASPA and FSA. Both laws 
 
 
 195. Id. at 23–24, 29–32.  
 196. Press Release, Presidential Study, supra note 142. 
 197. See Jennifer Trahan, U.S. Cash Rewards Program to Include International Criminal Court 
Arrests, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 10, 2013), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/01/10/u-s-cash-rewards-program-to-
include-international-criminal-court-arrests/. 
 198. See, e.g., Gabe Joselow, US Official Says Kenya Election Has ‘Consequences,’ VOICE OF 
AM. NEWS (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.voanews.com/content/us-official-says-kenya-elections-have-
consequences/1599063.html (inferring that there are consequences for Kenya to elect two current ICC 
indictees, and that “United States is not a signatory to the court, but does support what it stands for.”). 
 199. Anti-ICC Legislation Generally, AM. NON-GOV. ORGS. COAL. FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT., 
http://www.amicc.org/usicc/legislation (last visited Feb. 11, 2013). 
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are severe impediments to U.S.-ICC relations and are the most practically 
damaging, as they limit the scope of the U.S. government’s ability to 
support the ICC even if it wants to help. These laws also handcuff U.S. 
diplomats and politicians in carrying out American policy, leaving them 
unable to incentivize other States to cooperate with the ICC in cases of 
U.S. interest.200 In order to achieve a mutually beneficial US-ICC 
relationship, the relationship needs a clean slate unencumbered by 
legislative complications. As noted by a senior Bush administration 
official, the U.S. should reevaluate these laws because their purposes are 
no longer relevant.201 Given that most anti-ICC laws have already been 
repealed or partly eviscerated due to internal governmental disfavor with 
the legislations’ intended and unintended consequences, keeping any anti-
ICC legislation is unjustifiable.  
Even more so than nullifying the Bolton letter, eliminating these pieces 
of anti-ICC legislation may inflame ICC opposition in the U.S. Further, 
unlike the Bolton letter, the executive branch cannot simply revoke these 
laws. Revoking these laws will also be politically difficult, especially 
given that one of these laws is labeled the American Service Member 
Protection Act. Yet, a combination of strong leadership from the Obama 
administration, clear arguments on the benefits to the U.S., and timely and 
creative politics202—in addition to the help of civil society—will be more 
than sufficient to repeal such legislation. The priority should be to 
eliminate FSA first, as the financial prohibition is the most detrimental to 
U.S.-ICC relations and limiting to the scope of support options available to 
the U.S.203 Once this particular legislative breakthrough in U.S.-ICC 
relations is achieved, the ASPA is more easily addressed politically. In the 
end, the practical impacts that eliminating these legislative hurdles will 
have on the ICC will be beneficial to the U.S. as well, thus justifying the 
effort to improve the relationship in the first place.  
 
 
 200. See Rapp Interview, supra note 132. 
 201. Bellinger III, supra note 125.  
 202. For example, in addition to the tactic of inserting a repeal provision into a large omnibus 
piece of legislation, the Obama administration may consider inserting sunset provisions into ASPA 
and FSA. Such a tactic would allow for the U.S. government to monitor the ICC (e.g. allow the sunset 
to go through if the ICC is satisfactorily evolving) and provide political cover to conservative 
legislators in the short and long term.  
 203. The ICC has had and continues to have significant budget problems. If the U.S. were able to 
fund the ICC, it would alleviate major concerns that the U.S. and other States have with the Court, 
such as sufficient numbers of well-trained staff to discharge the increasingly enlarging ICC workload. 
See Press Release, Coal. for the Int’l Crim. Ct., ASP Reaches Controversial Compromise on ICC 
Budget (Dec. 21, 2012) [hereinafter CICC Budget Press Release], available at http://www.iccnow.org/ 
documents/CICC_PR_ASP10__ BUDGET_ADOPTION_FINAL_211211.pdf. 
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4. Increase U.S. Non-Governmental Actors Support of the ICC 
All too often, the U.S.-ICC relationship is seen through the prism of the 
U.S. government’s relationship with the ICC, with civil society 
encouraging progress in the U.S. government’s position.204 Although this 
specific dynamic will always need attention, it is imperative that the 
definition of the “U.S.-ICC relationship” is broadened to include direct 
assistance from non-governmental actors (i.e., civil society, donor 
community, corporations, individuals) on a systematic, large-scale basis. 
The U.S. non-governmental community is unparalleled in the world in 
many respects,205 and it behooves this community to commit its resources 
to the institutional support of the ICC and the Court’s ambitious mandate. 
The types of assistance at the disposal of the American non-
governmental actors are limitless. The American legal community is 
particularly well positioned to support the ICC. Provided that the Court 
agrees, large American law firms should offer to sponsor their highly 
experienced criminal lawyers for short or long-term ICC assignments to 
assist on, inter alia, a particular investigation, trial team, or judicial 
chamber.  
To mitigate the future loss of American lawyers with international 
criminal experience, American law schools should institute aggressive 
training programs where committed students receive a thorough academic 
education in international criminal law. They would then be posted for 
several years in under-served district attorney or public defender offices 
around the U.S., where they will gain valuable practical legal skills. After 
completion, they will be excellent candidates for ICC positions and will 
have contributed to the U.S. criminal justice system in the process. 
Moreover, engaged American lawyers need to become “ICC 
Ambassadors,” in that they educate themselves on the ICC and its regime, 
find pro bono opportunities to assist the ICC, and educate their legal and 
non-legal peers about the Court. Such organic efforts will raise the 
baseline of familiarity and comfort with the ICC in the U.S.—an important 
prerequisite to U.S. ratification. 
 
 
 204. See Letter from the American Branch of the Int’l Law Ass’n, Recommendations for Future 
U.S. Policy Towards the ICC (Mar. 18, 2010), available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/ 
ABILA_Letter_US_policy18Mar2010_en.pdf. 
 205. Zachary K. Pearce, Building a ‘Civil Society’ in the Young American Republic, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/zachary-k-pearce/building-a-civil-society-_b_ 
1383114.html; see FREEDOM HOUSE, REPORT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 2012: UNITED STATES (2012), 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2012/united-states (“The United States has one of 
the world’s strongest systems of legal protection for freedom of the press.”).  
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Just as important as substantive support to the ICC from the American 
civil society, the American donor community—including corporations—
should invest or enhance already existing investments in the ICC, 
particularly towards its fundamental operations. On top of the publicity 
benefits, this financial assistance will assist the ICC where it is most 
needed.206 
If an impressive cross-section of American non-governmental actors 
showed solidarity with the ICC, the political ramifications on the U.S. 
government’s relationship with the ICC would be potentially tectonic. A 
broad base of non-governmental support for the ICC would both neutralize 
the isolationist rhetoric in the U.S. as well as convince skeptical U.S. 
politicians and policy makers to reevaluate or change their position on the 
ICC.  
B. Recommendations to the ICC 
1. Expand ICC Presence in the U.S. 
The types of incremental leaps of faith that the ICC should consider 
employing are neither structural nor formalistic like those the U.S. should 
undertake. Rather, the ICC should contemplate two broad informal efforts 
that will nonetheless be instrumental in improving its relationship with the 
U.S.: expanding its presence in the U.S.; and responsibly and 
appropriately expanding the American presence at the ICC. 
For the first expansion, one such informal endeavor would be to foster 
the widespread recognition of the ICC and its formal and informal 
interlocutors in the U.S. With an effort to ensuring that the message is 
concise, clear, and accurate,207 the ICC—as opposed to just its cases—208 
needs to be a part of the national American conversation. To do so, the 
ICC, with the help of its supporters, could embark on a multipronged 
campaign targeting influential and/or underexposed quarters of the U.S. 
Given that 70% of Americans believe the U.S. should be a State Party to 
 
 
 206. CICC Budget Press Release, supra note 203.  
 207. The Kony 2012 campaign shows how mass media campaigns related to the ICC must be 
handled with care and consideration to ensure the avoidance of exploitation or faulty messaging. Anna 
Holligan, Invisible Children’s Kony Campaign Gets Support of ICC Prosecutor, BBC NEWS (Mar. 8, 
2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17303179.  
 208. See, e.g., id.; Peter James Spielmann, ICC Prosecutor: War Crimes Continue in Darfur; 
Sudan May Face More Charges, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.newser.com/article/ 
da3542kg0/icc-prosecutor-war-crimes-continue-in-darfur-sudan-may-face-more-charges.html.  
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the ICC, this effort could pay major dividends to the U.S.-ICC 
relationship.209 
For instance, the ICC should diligently send high-level representatives 
and interlocutors to national security, military, and other similar 
conferences in the U.S. At these conferences, the ICC would have the 
opportunity to show a presence and engage—as a panelist or active 
attendee—with influential U.S. constituencies that may have 
misconceptions or apprehensions of the Court. High ranking ICC 
representatives should take necessary steps to do appropriate interviews on 
national and local news outlets as well as American talk shows. Building 
relationships of trust with these mass media outlets would lead to 
continual invites for interviews, which would be a major resource for the 
ICC and its case work as well. These relationships may also pay dividends 
in expanding the reach of ICC press releases and other newsworthy events. 
Also, the ICC should proactively seek out a cross-section of U.S. 
constituencies—from faith-based groups210 to retired military associations 
and teacher organizations211—to visit the Court, learn more about its 
jurisdiction and its present cases, and to stay engaged with its activities. 
Lastly, if responsibly executed, Hollywood’s creativity and appeal could 
also be utilized to further the ICC’s exposure. Appropriate documentaries 
and fundraisers would not only benefit the ICC, but also lead to a wider 
American audience discussing the U.S.-ICC relationship.  
2. Reasonably and Appropriately Expand the U.S. Presence in the ICC 
It is obvious that for improvements to any non-State Party’s 
relationship with the ICC to occur, the State and the ICC must have 
regular and multifaceted interactions with one another. The U.S.-ICC 
relationship is no different. However, the U.S.-ICC relationship has unique 
history that engenders both hope and sensitivities among and between the 
 
 
 209. Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Foreign Policy in the New Millennium, at 23 (2012), 
available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/2012_CCS_Report.pdf; see American Public Support for the 
ICC, AM. NON-GOV. ORGS. COAL. FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.amicc.org/usicc/opinion (last 
visited Feb. 11, 2013). 
 210. Faith-based groups in the U.S. were instrumental in pushing President Bush to abstain from 
the UN Security Council vote on the Sudan referral to the ICC. Letter from Evalyn Bassoff et al. to 
George W. Bush, then President of the United States of America (Feb. 4, 2005), available at 
http://archive.maryknollogc.org/regional/asia/darfur%20sign%20on%20letter%20for%20website.pdf. 
 211. See Letter from Eugene J. Carroll, Jr. to former President of the United States of America 
William J. Clinton (Dec. 22, 2000), http://www.amicc.org/docs/RetMilOff12_00.pdf (exhibiting that 
the support of retired military members can have real impact).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
618 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 12:581 
 
 
 
 
ICC, its State Parties, and the U.S.212 Some may feel that American 
presence at the ICC is either already too great or unjustified. The ICC and 
its State Parties may have every right to react negatively to an increase in 
American presence at the Court, in light of the general history of 
international criminal tribunals213 and the U.S. refusal to join the 
consensus of the world on a permanent international criminal court. As a 
result, it is a loaded statement to say that the ICC should consider 
increasing the U.S.’s presence at the Court.  
These legitimate points aside, it remains to the benefit of the ICC and 
its relationship with the U.S. to find appropriate ways within the confines 
of its procedures and regulations to invite, permit, or otherwise involve 
more Americans at the ICC. Likewise, the ICC’s cultural receptivity to 
such an expansion would be a necessity as well. To be clear, this 
suggestion does not mean that the presence of Americans at the ICC is 
insufficient to date or that the ICC itself is presently against a U.S. 
presence in any respect. It is merely to confirm that part and parcel of 
improving U.S.-ICC relations would require the appropriate expansion, or 
at least maintenance, of American presence at the ICC.214 
Such expansion could include the continued use of the visiting 
professional program to appoint pro bono special advisors to the Office of 
the Prosecutor,215 the expansion of this practice to other organs of the ICC, 
 
 
 212. See, e.g., Mark Kersten, A Big Day for the US and the ICC: Rewards for Justice Program 
Extended, JUSTICE IN CONFLICT (Jan. 8, 2013), http://justiceinconflict.org/2013/01/08/a-big-day-for-
the-us-and-the-icc-rewards-for-justice-program-extended/. But see Mark Leon Goldberg, U.S. Senators 
Threaten Retaliation for Palestine U.N. Bid, UN DISPATCH (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.undispatch. 
com/us-senators-threaten-retaliation-against-palestinian-un-bid. 
 213. Many international practitioners and commentators of civil law backgrounds believe that 
most of the UN ad hoc and hybrid tribunals (in addition to Nuremberg) were too heavily common law 
influenced vis-à-vis the United States. As a result, the ICC is often viewed as an improved hybrid 
between common and civil law in comparison to its UN tribunal brethren. See, e.g., Paul Tavernier, 
The Experience of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, 
321 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 605 (1997), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/ 
article/other/57jnyy.htm (“[t]he Statute of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which 
served as a model for that of the Rwanda Tribunal, was drafted by the United Nations Department of 
Legal Affairs and by common law experts. It is therefore greatly influenced by common law, as 
already applied in Nuremberg.”). 
 214. The ICC taking such a measure would also be a favor to the U.S. and could be appropriately 
cast as such. As raised above, the U.S. risks losing its capacity on the practice of international criminal 
law as other international tribunals close and the ICC is the only tribunal left. In order to help augment 
that brain drain as well as help U.S.-ICC relations, this effort to expand Americans at the ICC would 
be a welcomed measure.  
 215. See, e.g., Press Release, Int’l Crim. Ct., ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda Appoints Patricia 
Sellers, Leila Sadat and Diane Marie Amann as Special Advisers (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/EN_Menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/news%20and%20highlights/pages/pr
861.aspx.  
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and the appointment of American experts on both legal and non-legal 
subject matters, such as office communication practices.216 Ensuring the 
continued practice of accepting American interns217 would provide for 
long-term American interest in the Court and fortify lasting impressions of 
the ICC on future leaders in the U.S. Provided it has no actual or perceived 
favoritism and abides by all applicable regulations, the ICC should 
encourage qualified Americans to apply for open positions in all of its 
organs.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
In terms of complexity, the U.S.-ICC circular conundrum is only 
overshadowed by the U.S.-ICC relationship itself. The ebbs and flows of 
the relationship have left a sour taste in the mouths of some and pessimism 
in the minds of others. As a result, the recently resurrected relationship 
feels slightly forced and is undoubtedly delicate. 
Yet, we should not let the present dictate the future. It is very possible 
that one day, sooner than expected, this precarious moment in the U.S.-
ICC relationship will look just as distant as ratification seems to us 
today.218 This sentiment is neither to say that significant hurdles do not 
exist to achieve even intermediate progress, nor that it will not take 
substantial investments of advocacy, education, and engagement to see 
such change. Both are true. 
This Article’s goal, however, is to show that the gulf between the U.S. 
and ICC is not created by centuries of philosophical disagreement or old 
political wars. Rather, the divide is a matter of practicalities: the ability of 
a new tribunal to fulfill its mandate successfully and earn the trust of 
States.219 Given the Article’s position that it is a practical matter, bridging 
the divide seems less daunting and all the more humanly possible. To start 
building that bridge, both the U.S. and ICC need to start making small 
changes on their sides of the divide. The incremental leaps of faith are 
 
 
 216. The receipt of such outside assistance is tied directly with the recommendations for U.S. 
incremental leaps of faith. See supra Part V.A.4, “Increase U.S. Non-Governmental Actors Support of 
the ICC.” 
 217. Internships, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www2.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Recruitment/Internships+ 
and+Visiting+professionals/Eligibility+Requirements/Internships.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2013) 
(does not include State Party eligibility requirement). 
 218. Fairlie, supra note 133, at 573; Mark Kersten, Obama and the ICC: Four Reasons Not to 
Hold Your Breath, JUSTICE IN CONFLICT (Nov. 7, 2012), http://justiceinconflict.org/2012/11/07/ 
obama-and-the-icc-four-reasons-not-to-hold-your-breath/. 
 219. Koh & Rapp Press Statement, supra note 54 (“[O]ver time, there’s a possibility that we may 
gain confidence in this institution and that would enable us to move forward.”). 
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attainable gains. In time, these steps will lead each to positive results for 
both sides: the U.S. will see an improved Court and the ICC will see more 
steady and robust U.S. support. 
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